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REVEALING CHOICES: USING TAXPAYER CHOICE
TO TARGET TAX ENFORCEMENT
Alex Raskolnikov*
People pay their taxes for many different reasons. Some choose to game
the system, paying only when the cost of noncompliance outweighs its bene-
fits. Others comply out of habit, a sense of duty or reciprocity, a desire to
avoid feelings of guilt or shame, and for many other reasons. Our tax en-
forcement system has ignored this variety of taxpaying motivations for de-
cades. It continues to rely primarily on audits and penalties, at least where
information reporting and withholding are impossible. Fines and audits de-
ter those rationally playing the tax compliance game, but are wasteful or even
counterproductive when applied to others. The shortcomings of the current
one-size-fits-all approach to tax enforcement are well understood. They also
appear to be insurmountable.
This Article argues that it is possible to design a more tailored regime.
The idea is to separate taxpayers based on their taxpaying motivations by
creating two different enforcement regimes and inducing taxpayers to choose
one when they file their annual returns. With this separation accomplished,
the government can target enforcement by matching enforcement policies to
taxpayer types. Those who choose to game the system will be deterred by
higher penalties in one regime. Everyone else will be induced to comply by
cooperative enforcement measures in the other. If successful, separation and
targeted enforcement will improve tax compliance without raising its social
cost, or keep the level of compliance unchanged while making tax adminis-
tration more efficient.
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INTRODUCTION
Most Americans pay most of their taxes most of the time. That is as
far as useful generalizations can go. If decades-long research of tax com-
pliance has produced one clear finding, it is that taxpayers' motivations
for complying with the tax law differ. Some are afraid of audits, others of
[Vol. 109:689
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penalties; some are constrained by peer disapproval, others by their own
guilty feelings; some follow a duty, others a habit, and there are even
those (like Justice Holmes) who pay their taxes because they like it.' Just
as many reasons explain significant and persistent noncompliance.
The government's efforts to reduce tax avoidance and evasion have
largely ignored this bewildering variety of motivations. Audits, penalties,
withholding, and information reporting have remained the weapons of
choice for decades. Scholars have long acknowledged the severe limita-
tions of this approach, but have offered few innovative solutions. Not
surprisingly, the government's attempts to improve tax compliance over
the past forty years have been largely unsuccessful.
This Article suggests a radical departure from the traditional ap-
proach to tax administration. I argue that the government should aban-
don its current one-size-fits-all strategy and begin to target enforcement
based on taxpayer motivations. The proposal faces an obvious problem:
Motivations are hidden from the government and are not always clear to
taxpayers themselves. This problem, the Article argues, can be solved by
using information-forcing mechanisms developed in legal and economic
literatures and adopted by businesses around the world. The specific so-
lution considered in detail involves replacing the existing regime with a
menu of two different ones and forcing taxpayers to choose between
them when they file their annual returns. Selecting a regime will induce
taxpayers to sort themselves based on their reasons for complying with
the tax law. The choice of regime, that is, will reveal taxpaying motiva-
tions to the tax administrator.
The first of the two proposed regimes (the deterrence regime) will look
very similar to the current one, except statutory fines in that regime may
be higher (perhaps much higher) than they are today. The second re-
gime (the compliance regime) will have relatively low penalties, but taxpay-
ers choosing it will be required to accept certain conditions. Because
these conditions will be very costly for rational, deterrence-oriented tax-
payers who try to game the tax system (garners) but much less costly for all
others, the former will prefer to face higher penalties in the deterrence
regime while the rest will elect the alternative.
For example, to avoid the deterrence regime a taxpayer may be re-
quired to agree that, in any future dispute with the IRS, the government's
position will be presumed correct unless proven otherwise by clear and
convincing evidence. This will be a dramatic (extremely costly) conces-
sion for anyone interested in using tax shelters to game the system. But
to those who pay taxes out of a sense of reciprocity, this will not be a cost
at all. These reciprocators are uninterested in exploiting loopholes, so
agreeing to abide by tax rules that are (almost) loophole-free will be easy
for them.
1. "I like to pay taxes. With them I buy civilization." Randolph E. Paul, Taxation for
Prosperity 277 (1947) (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.).
2009]
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A pro-government presumption is hardly the only measure that is
likely to impose varying costs or benefits on gamers and reciprocators. A
precommitment to binding arbitration, a waiver of the tax preparer privi-
lege, more demanding standards and stronger sanctions for tax advisors,
enhanced prefiling assistance, and cooperative, problem-solving audits
are other possible compliance regime features likely to facilitate the de-
sired separation.
If reciprocators are the only group of taxpayers who will be separated
from gamers by the proposed reform, the dual regime idea is not particu-
larly robust. The proposal's most attractive feature, however, is that it
requires extremely weak assumptions about taxpayer motivations. The
pro-government presumption and other conditions just described are
likely to impose relatively low costs not only on reciprocity-driven individ-
uals, but also on those who are significantly constrained by a sense of
duty, those motivated by feelings of guilt or shame, habitual compliers,
and even some calculative utility maximizers. Only for a specific group of
taxpayers-rational actors whose marginal compliance decisions depend
primarily on the expected tax penalty calculus-will the proposed condi-
tions be very costly. These gainers will mostly choose the deterrence
regime.
Distinguishing gainers from everyone else (rather than dividing tax-
payers along other lines suggested in the literature 2 ) is particularly useful
2. Bruno Frey distinguishes between a person's intrinsic and extrinsic motivations.
See Bruno S. Frey, Tertium Datur: Pricing, Regulating and Intrinsic Motivation, 45 Kyklos
161, 161, 166 (1992) (differentiating the two, and noting that external intervention can
either support or damage an individual's intrinsic motivation). Valerie Braithwaite
suggests that taxpayers have several motivational postures toward tax authorities. See
Valerie Braithwaite, Dancing with Tax Authorities: Motivational Postures and Non-
compliant Actions, in Taxing Democracy: Understanding Tax Avoidance and Evasion 15,
18 (Valerie Braithwaite ed., 2003) [hereinafter Braithwaite, Dancing] (describing these
postures as commitment, capitulation, resistance, disengagement, and game playing).
Both approaches are descriptive. Neither author suggests how the government should
adjust its enforcement strategies to account for differences among taxpayers. Braithwaite
expressly acknowledges that attitudes do not translate directly into behavior. See id. at 33
(reporting that correlations between motivational postures and compliance-related
activities are uniformly low). Leandra Lederman proposes to distinguish salary earners
from those who earn primarily business income and to concentrate deterrence efforts on
the latter. See Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax
Compliance, 64 Ohio St. L.J. 1453, 1462-63 (2003) ("[A] norms-based appeal might be
cost-effective with respect to taxpayers with primary wage and investment income ...
[A] dditional enforcement with respect to groups of self-employed taxpayers might succeed
in shifting the norm from noncompliance to compliance."). The suggestion-based on a
well-known fact that salary income is misreported much less than business income-does
not account for differences in taxpayer motivations. As a result, it focuses on a
consequence rather than a cause. For example, the fact that an individual pays taxes on
her entire salary reveals only that she has no opportunity to hide salary income. This
taxpayer may be a gamer hiding a considerable amount of investment income offshore. A
business income recipient, in contrast, may be paying every penny he owes out of a sense of
duty, as Lederman herself points out. See id. at 1507-08 (noting one self-employed
couple's deliberate selection of "an accountant who would not cheat," though suggesting
[Vol. 109:689
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because a well-developed economic model of deterrence provides clear
prescriptions for improving tax compliance among garners. Using the
same strategies with non-garners is wasteful at best and counterproductive
at worst. At the same time, policy instruments that are effective with non-
gamers may well decrease compliance among gamers. Separating these
two broad categories of taxpayers will allow the government to target en-
forcement by matching enforcement policies to taxpayer types. Garners
will face large statutory fines, adversarial examinations, and highly public
tax prosecutions in the deterrence regime. Non-gamers will be induced
to comply by helpful, readily available prefiling advice, respectful audits,
mass media campaigns emphasizing widespread compliance, and the like
in the compliance regime.
Targeted tax enforcement is likely to be superior to the current one-
size-fits-all approach on welfarist grounds. It can produce stronger deter-
rence and improved voluntary compliance at a lower social cost (or, if
one prefers to keep the level of deterrence unchanged, improved volun-
tary compliance at a much lower social cost). As important, a dual en-
forcement system based on taxpayer choice is bound to be more politi-
cally acceptable than an across-the-board application of most features
found in either environment.
The proposed dual regime contemplates a radical overhaul of our
tax enforcement system. Yet it is well grounded because some of today's
tax rules already reflect differential enforcement based on taxpayer
choice. 3 These rules, however, are isolated and have a very limited reach.
The Article's goal is to explore how an information-forcing dual enforce-
ment regime can be used to reform-and significantly improve-the en-
tire tax administration.
The Article begins by arguing that the current unsatisfactory state of
tax compliance is caused by the government's failure to take account of
taxpayer motivations. Separating garners from all others and targeting
tax enforcement, Part I suggests, can improve social welfare and reduce
avoidance and evasion. Part II explains how forcing taxpayers to choose
such behavior might be atypical). While it is possible that people particularly averse to
paying taxes choose occupations where income is not subject to withholding or
information reporting, empirical support for this self-sorting hypothesis is limited. See
Joel Slemrod, Small Business and the Tax System, in The Crisis in Tax Administration 69,
94-95 (HenryJ. Aaron &Joel Slemrod eds., 2004) [hereinafter Slemrod, Small Business]
(suggesting small business sector's growth during periods of higher tax rates is connected
to noncompliance opportunities in that sector).
3. For instance, taxpayers and tax preparers may currently avoid penalties by choosing
to take a more conservative position without disclosing it on a return or by adopting a
more aggressive position and disclosing it to the IRS. See I.R.C. §§ 6662(d) (2) (B),
6694(a) (2) (2006) (providing rules for taxpayers and preparers, respectively). Similarly,
tax amnesties and settlements usually promise reduced penalties to those taxpayers who
choose to reveal their abusive transactions to tax authorities. See, e.g., I.R.S.
Announcement 2002-2, 2002-1 C.B. 304 (announcing amnesty); I.R.S. Announcement
2004-46, 2004-21 I.R.B. 964 (announcing settlement offer).
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between two enforcement regimes should separate taxpayers based on
their motivations. Part III introduces and discusses a variety of specific
features that are likely to produce this separation. Part IV highlights
strengths and weaknesses of the proposed dual enforcement environ-
ment. A brief conclusion follows.
I. RESPONDING TO DIFFERENCES IN MOTIVATIONS WITH
TARGETED ENFORCEMENT
Over the past four decades, Congress, the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS), legal academics, economists, psychologists, and political scientists
have devoted significant effort to studying and improving tax compliance.
Yet estimates of the total taxes paid as a fraction of the total taxes that
should be paid hover between eighty and eighty-five percent, seemingly
impervious to the ebb and flow of legislative attacks and administrative
initiatives. 4 The reason for this lack of success, this Part suggests, is three-
fold. First, most government measures assume a model of taxpayer be-
havior that, while useful, fails to capture the motivations of millions of
taxpayers. Second, alternative behavioral models are numerous and va-
ried, making it difficult to design specific enforcement policies. And
third, while the limitations of the current one-size-fits-all approach to tax
administration are widely acknowledged, there have been few suggestions
for designing more tailored regimes.
A. Playing the Tax Compliance Game
Penalties, audits, and constraints on opportunities to evade or avoid
tax laws have dominated tax administration for decades.5 The unstated
(and sometimes stated) premise of this approach is a model of taxpayer
4. In 1992, the tax gap (taxes owed but not paid) represented about the same
proportion of taxes owed as in 1973-17.3%. James Andreoni et al., Tax Compliance, 36J.
Econ. Lit. 818, 819 (1998). The latest estimate is for 2001, and it is slightly over 16%. Eric
Toder, What Is the Tax Gap?, 117 Tax Notes 367, 367 (2007). Uncertainty associated with
the estimating procedures used to determine the tax gap and changes in the estimating
methodology that have taken place over time raise some doubts about the gap's true size.
Joel Slemrod, Cheating Ourselves: The Economics of Tax Evasion, J. Econ. Persp., Winter
2007, at 25, 27 [hereinafter Slemrod, Cheating Ourselves]; see also Toder, supra, at 372-76
(providing detailed discussion of factors that contribute to uncertainty in measuring tax
gap).
5. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 81 B.U. L. Rev. 333, 343
(2001) [hereinafter Kahan, Trust] ("[T]ax-enforcement policy.., continues to reflect the
conventional model's emphasis on material incentives."); Lederman, supra note 2, at 1456
(noting that IRS tax enforcement reflects "standard answer" for improving compliance-
the provision of incentives). A period of increased attention to taxpayer service that
started in 1998 came to an abrupt end when the government recognized the magnitude of
the tax shelter crisis just a few years later. See, e.g., David CayJohnston, I.R.S. Is Bolstering
Efforts to Curb Cheating on Taxes, N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 2000, at Al (reporting large
increase in IRS budget to curb tax evasion); Slemrod, Cheating Ourselves, supra note 4, at
38 (referring to post-1998 decline in enforcement as "temporary phenomenon").
[Vol. 109:689
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behavior that underlies the economic analysis of deterrence. 6 In that
model, taxpayers are viewed as rational individuals who maximize their
expected utility by comparing the costs and benefits of paying taxes with
those of failing to pay.7 Taxpayers are trying to game the system; the
government is trying to beat them at their game. To evaluate the cost of
noncompliance, these gainers discount statutory (or nominal) penalties
by the probability that they will actually have to pay these fines
(probability of punishment). In order to strengthen deterrence, the
model suggests, the government needs to increase expected penalties by
raising nominal sanctions, probability of punishment, or some combina-
tion of the two.
The major impact of economic analysis on legal scholarship and tax
administration is understandable. The deterrence model is rigorous,
tractable, and capable of generating concrete policy prescriptions that
coincide with some deep-seated intuitions. Moreover, numerous experi-
ments suggest that at least some taxpayers are indeed gamers who act
consistently with the model's predictions.
8
However, it is beyond doubt that this model fails to describe the be-
havior of many individuals. Given extremely low existing penalties,
gainers have no incentive to pay any tax.9 Yet numerous taxpayers com-
ply with tax law even though they have a clear opportunity to evade or
avoid their obligations. 10 When researchers experiment with varying the
probability of detection, the effect on compliance is not as stark as the
economic model suggests it should be.11 And the impact of altering
6. See Alex Raskolnikov, Crime and Punishment in Taxation: Deceit, Deterrence,
and the Self-Adjusting Penalty, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 569, 579 n.44 (2006) [hereinafter
Raskolnikov, Self-Adjusting Penalty] (citing legislative history and IRS policy statements
articulating deterrence-based approaches).
7. The foundational article is Michael G. Allingham & Agnar Sandmo, Income Tax
Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis, I J. Pub. Econ. 323 (1972), modified in Shlomo Yitzhaki,
A Note on Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis, 3J. Pub. Econ. 201 (1974).
8. See James Alm & Sarah Jacobson, Using Laboratory Experiments in Public
Economics, 60 Nat'l TaxJ. 129, 134-35 (2007); Andreoni et al., supra note 4, at 842.
9. See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz & Louis L. Wilde, The Economics of Tax Compliance:
Fact and Fantasy, 38 Nat'l TaxJ. 355, 358 (1985) ("Application of the standard economic
theory of crime to tax avoidance . . . produces an unambiguous prediction of behavior:
throughout the 1970s no one should have paid the taxes they owed .... ").
10. See Andreoni et al., supra note 4, at 821 (concluding that, even taking lack of
opportunity to evade taxes on certain types of income into account, "taxpayers still appear
to be more honest than might be expected" from the expected penalty calculation). While
it has been argued that the disparity between actual taxpayer compliance and that
predicted by the deterrence model can be explained by risk aversion, the degree of risk
aversion needed to explain existing compliance by taxpayers who have an opportunity to
evade is unrealistically high. Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, Tax Compliance as the Result of
a Psychological Tax Contract: The Role of Incentives and Responsive Regulation, 29 Law
& Pol'y 102, 102 (2007).
11. See, e.g., Andreoni et al., supra note 4, at 841-44, 846 (reviewing empirical
evidence); Feld & Frey, supra note 10, at 108 (comparing studies); Joel Slemrod et al.,
Taxpayer Response to an Increased Probability of Audit: Evidence from a Controlled
2009]
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nominal penalties is decidedly ambiguous.1 2 Moreover, when researchers
ask randomly selected individuals to explain their motivations for paying
taxes, fear of audits and penalties is not at the top of the list.13 Clearly,
not every taxpayer is a rational gamer straight out of Gary Becker's model
of crime and punishment. 14 It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the
continuing emphasis on fines and audits has produced no apparent im-
provement in tax compliance.'
5
B. Beyond Gaming
If gaming the system is not the primary taxpayer motivation, what is?
The list of alternative "nonrational" explanations is long. There is evi-
dence that some people pay taxes to avoid the feelings of guilt or shame
they would experience if their noncompliance were detected and prose-
cuted.16 Researchers argue that taxpayers may be guided by a sense of
duty, sometimes conceptualizing it as a decisionmaking heuristic.
1 7
Experiment in Minnesota, 79J. Pub. Econ. 455, 465 (2001) (finding that higher audit rates
increased reported income and taxes paid by low- and middle-income taxpayers, especially
those with greater opportunities to evade, but decreased reported income of high-income
taxpayers).
12. See, e.g., Andreoni et al., supra note 4, at 842, 846 (evaluating studies); Feld &
Frey, supra note 10, at 108 (finding mixed results in empirical studies); Slemrod, Cheating
Ourselves, supra note 4, at 38 (concluding that "there has been no compelling empirical
evidence addressing how noncompliance is affected by the penalty for detected evasion, as
distinct from the probability that a given act of noncompliance will be subject to
punishment").
13. See Harold G. Grasmick & Robert J. Bursik, Jr., Conscience, Significant Others,
and Rational Choice: Extending the Deterrence Model, 24 Law & Soc'y Rev. 837, 840-41,
851 (1990) [hereinafter Grasmick & Bursik, Conscience] (showing that effect of guilt (also
referred to as "shame" or "self-imposed punishment") on deterring tax cheating is more
than one-and-a-half times greater than effect of legal sanctions, which, however, is greater
than effect of threat of embarrassment (or socially imposed punishment)); Harold G.
Grasmick & Wilbur J. Scott, Tax Evasion and Mechanisms of Social Control: A
Comparison with Grand and Petty Theft, 2 J. Econ. Psychol. 213, 223-25 (1982)
[hereinafter Grasmick & Scott, Tax Evasion] (reporting that feelings of guilt are stronger
inhibitor of tax evasion than threat of stigma, which, in turn, is stronger inhibitor than
threat of legal sanctions).
14. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol.
Econ. 169 (1968).
15. It is conceivable, of course, that every time Congress or the IRS has strengthened
deterrence by raising statutory penalties or increasing audit rates, some other policy or
economic or social change negated what would have been the positive effect of these
measures on tax compliance. Because it will never be possible to control for all variables
when introducing policy changes in real life, statements like the one made in the text are
inevitably imprecise. But it is worth noting that, to my knowledge, no research has
unearthed specific changes that repeatedly offset a positive effect of stronger deterrence-
oriented measures introduced over the past four decades.
16. See, e.g., Andreoni et al., supra note 4, at 850-51; Grasmick & Scott, Tax Evasion,
supra note 13, at 214-15.
17. See John T. Scholz & Neil Pinney, Duty, Fear, and Tax Compliance: The
Heuristic Basis of Citizenship Behavior, 39 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 490, 493 (1995) ("The duty
696 [Vol. 109:689
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Some models incorporate taxpayers who comply out of habit.' 8 Survey
data indicate that tax compliance is related to attitudes toward govern-
ment,19 perceptions of fairness of the tax burden, 20 and the direct versus
representative nature of democratic institutions.2' Other explanations
include taxpayer morale,2 2 psychological contract, 23 motivational pos-
tures, 24 and social identity.25 These nonrational (or "irrational") reasons
for tax compliance do not suggest that non-gamers act randomly or with-
out purpose. Rather, these taxpayers are nonrational in a formal sense:
They have preferences other than the two basic preferences for consump-
tion and leisure that underlie the traditional neoclassical model of
deterrence 26
In addition to the variety of theories of taxpayer behavior, empirical
research has identified numerous factors that affect taxpaying decisions.
Age, 27 gender,28 marital status,29 educational level,30 religious convic-
heuristic claims that the citizen's sense of duty to obey laws provides . . . cues for
compliance decisions .... ").
18. See Michael J. Graetz et al., The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive
Theory of Law Enforcement, 2J.L. Econ. & Org. 1, 7 (1986) [hereinafter Graetz et al., Tax
Compliance Game] (introducing model that includes "'habitual compliers'-individuals
who endeavor to report taxable income correctly without regard either to the costs and
benefits of playing the audit lottery or to their perceptions about the compliance behavior
of others").
19. See Andreoni et al., supra note 4, at 845, 851.
20. See id. at 851.
21. See Feld & Frey, supra note 10, at 113 (summarizing several studies of Swiss
cantons).
22. See Bruno S. Frey & Benno Torgler, Tax Morale and Conditional Cooperation, 35
J. Comp. Econ. 136, 137 (2007).
23. See Feld & Frey, supra note 10, at 104.
24. See Braithwaite, Dancing, supra note 2, at 18.
25. See Natalie Taylor, Understanding Taxpayer Attitudes Through Understanding
Taxpayer Identities, in Taxing Democracy, supra note 2, at 71, 74-75.
26. See Allingham & Sandmo, supra note 7, at 325-27 (introducing utility function of
putative tax evader that depends on income and reputation, but restricting further analysis
to utility function depending solely on income); Becker, supra note 14, at 177 n.16
(describing putative criminal's utility function as depending solely on income, albeit
stating that income may include "psychic income" without further elaboration).
27. See Andreoni et al., supra note 4, at 840-41 (reporting that older taxpayers are
more compliant).
28. See id. at 841 (finding that women are more compliant than men).
29. See id. at 840 (reporting that single people are more compliant than married
couples).
30. See James Aim & Benno Torgler, Culture Differences and Tax Morale in the
United States and in Europe, 27 J. Econ. Psychol. 224, 228, 237 (2006) (finding that
"individuals with the lowest education have the highest tax morale," defined as "moral
principles or values that individuals hold about paying their tax").
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tions,31 taxpayer reference groups, 3 2 and even emotional arousal 33 have
all been shown to matter. There is evidence that differences among na-
tional cultures influence tax compliance as well.3 4 None of these factors
should have any effect if everyone is a gamer.
3 5
Another suggestion is that people pay their taxes out of feelings of
reciprocity. 36 Of all nonrational theories of human behavior, the theory
of reciprocity has the strongest empirical foundation. 37 Numerous exper-
iments have shown that a substantial portion of subjects consistently act
in direct contradiction to the rational utility maximizer model. They
share assets in an investment game despite clear material incentives to
31. Compare Michael R. Welch et al., "But Everybody Does It...": The Effects of
Perceptions, Moral Pressures, and Informal Sanctions on Tax Cheating, 25 Soc. Spectrum
21, 43-45 (2005) (reporting almost no differences based on religiosity), with Harold G.
Grasmick et al., "Render unto Caesar What Is Caesar's": Religiosity and Taxpayers'
Inclinations to Cheat, 32 Soc. Q. 251, 263 (1991) (finding that highly religious taxpayers
are less inclined to commit tax evasion than less religious ones).
32. See Frank A. Cowell, Cheating the Government: The Economics of Evasion
102-03 (1990) ("Evidence. . . suggest[s] that whether or not a taxpayer is compliant with
tax demands is significantly affected by the social grouping in which the taxpayer finds
himself."); Marco R. Steenbergen et al., Taxpayer Adaptation to the 1986 Tax Reform Act:
Do New Tax Laws Affect the Way Taxpayers Think About Taxes?, in Why People Pay Taxes:
Tax Compliance and Enforcement 9, 29-30 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992) (noting that
taxpayers' commitment to complying with tax law depends on attitudes of those with
whom taxpayers interacted in the months leading to a major tax reform); Welch et al.,
supra note 31, at 45 (finding that those who perceive that many members of their
community commit tax evasion are more likely to evade themselves).
33. See Giorgio Coricelli et al., Tax Evasion: Cheating Rationally or Deciding
Emotionally? 32 (Inst. for the Study of Labor, Discussion Paper No. 3103, 2007), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1028476 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (concluding
that tax compliance decision is "cognitively demanding" and finding positive correlation
between time taken by subjects to make this decision and emotional arousal).
34. See James Alm et al., Economic and Noneconomic Factors in Tax Compliance, 48
Kyklos 3, 4 (1995) (finding that both level of compliance and change in that level in
response to different policy instruments vary significantly between U.S. and Spanish
experimental subjects); Andreoni et al., supra note 4, at 822 (noting that "evasion varies
widely across nations, reaching extremely high levels in some developing countries").
35. If any of these factors affect perceived probability of punishment or perceived
nominal fine, this evidence supports (rather than undermines) the deterrence model.
Research suggesting such a relationship is very limited, however. See, e.g., Grasmick &
Bursik, Conscience, supra note 13, at 848-49 (reporting that males and older respondents
perceive lower expected sanctions-legal as well as those based on shame and
embarrassment-than females and younger individuals, but finding no similar relationship
based on education level).
36. See Kahan, Trust, supra note 5, at 340-44 (describing "trust model" of collective
action, under which individual citizens' motivations to pay taxes stem from "their
perception that other citizens are or are not inclined to pay," and reviewing empirical
support for the model).
37. For a review, see Christina M. Fong et al., Strong Reciprocity and the Welfare
State, in 2 Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity 1439, 1447-50
(Serge-Christophe Kohm & Jean Mercier Ythier eds., 2006).
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the contrary. 38 They make contributions in a public good game where
the rational strategy is to contribute nothing. 39 They irrationally respond
to nonbinding assurances of future cooperation (so-called cheap talk).40
At the same time, people do not like being taken advantage of-their
cooperation is conditional. When players observe that others "defect,"
they reciprocate with their own defections and cooperation unravels.
4 1
But if cooperative players can punish defectors while maintaining cooper-
ation with nondefecting players, they do so even when the punishment is
costly to the cooperators themselves. 42 Again, a rational player would
never do such a thing.
The theory of reciprocity has made significant inroads into classical
economics, as well as law and economics. 43 Yet the link between public
good, ultimatum, and similar games and real-life tax compliance is tenu-
ous. While taxpayers do seem to care about the tax compliance of others
in making their own taxpaying decisions, the connection is weak.
44
38. See Joyce Berg et al., Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History, 10 Games & Econ.
Behav. 122, 123-24 (1995).
39. Fong et al., supra note 37, at 1448-49.
40. See Alm & Jacobson, supra note 8, at 139.
41. See Fong et al., supra note 37, at 1449.
42. Id.
43. See Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, Walrasian Economics in Retrospect, 115 QJ.
Econ. 1411, 1413-19 (2000) (explaining that "over the closing fifteen years of [the
twentieth] century... an empirically grounded view of economic behavior... has arisen
to challenge the Homo economicus" (emphasis omitted)); Fong et al., supra note 37, at
1457-59 (relating reciprocity principle to citizens' opinions on welfare state policies);
Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 Colum. L. Rev.
1641, 1644-45 (2003) (positing that theory of reciprocity explains existence of certain
legally unenforceable contracts).
44. One of the exceedingly few studies examining changes in actual tax compliance in
response to stimulants other than threats of audits and penalties is Michael Wenzel,
Misperceptions of Social Norms About Tax Compliance: From Theory to Intervention, 26
J. Econ. Psychol. 862 (2005) [hereinafter Wenzel, Misperceptions]. Wenzel addressed the
"self-other discrepancy," revealing that while taxpayers largely believe in honest taxpaying,
they attribute to others a more accepting attitude toward tax cheating. See id. at 864-65.
Informing taxpayers of this discrepancy, including the fact that others also believe in
honest tax compliance, reduced non-work-related deductions, but had no effect on work-
related deduction claims, even though information about the discrepancy provided to
taxpayers expressly referred to these claims. Id. at 877-78. Studies finding that taxpayer
perceptions of other taxpayers affect taxpaying attitudes and intentions (rather than
actions) are more numerous. See Cowell, supra note 32, at 102-03 ("Evidence .. .
[suggests] that whether or not a taxpayer is compliant with tax demands is significantly
affected by the social grouping in which the taxpayer finds himself."); Steven M. Sheffrin &
Robert K. Triest, Can Brute Deterrence Backfire? Perceptions and Attitudes in Taxpayer
Compliance, in Why People Pay Taxes, supra note 32, at 193, 213 (finding that taxpayers
evincing less faith in honesty of others have more permissive attitudes towards tax evasion);
Steenbergen et al., supra note 32, at 9, 29-30 (linking taxpayers' commitment to
compliance to attitudes of those with whom they interacted in the months leading to a
major tax reform); Welch et al., supra note 31, at 22 (finding that "the more prevalent an
individual perceives tax evasion to be within the community, the less likely the individual
will be to judge the act harshly, the less likely he or she will be to fear informal sanctions
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When asked, real taxpayers repeatedly assert that their main reason for
paying taxes honestly is personal integrity4 5 or anticipation of the guilt
they would feel if they failed to comply.4 6 Reciprocal motivations are at
the bottom of the list, behind the threat of sanctions.4 7 More generally,
recent research indicates that the connection between the results of reci-
procity-testing games and reciprocal behavior in daily interactions is com-
plex.4 8 Some responses that have been initially attributed to reciprocity
appear to have a different cause. 49 In sum, while many of us may well be
contingent reciprocators, 50 it is premature to conclude that reciprocity is
the primary cause of tax compliance. At least for the purposes of design-
ing real-life policy proposals, it is more reasonable to view reciprocity as
just one more nonrational explanation of taxpayer behavior, alongside
many others.
Finally, nonrationality is not the only reason one may be a non-
gamer. Even purely rational actors may not respond to tax penalties and
audits in a way predicted by the economic model of deterrence. An ille-
gal immigrant working for cash and not reporting his income to the IRS
has much more to worry about than fines for tax evasion. If a bank lends
to a small entrepreneur based on his taxable income, the entrepreneur's
incentive to report his earnings truthfully is not based solely (or even
primarily) on expected tax penalties.5 1 And the tax director of a large
corporation may care little about relatively small statutory fines in the
directed against it, and the more inclined the individual will be to commit tax evasion in
the future").
45. See IRS Oversight Bd., 2005 Taxpayer Attitude Survey tbl.4, available at http://
www.ustreas.gov/irsob/releases/2006/02212006.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(reporting that personal integrity was primary reason for tax compliance in each year from
2002 to 2005).
46. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
47. See IRS Oversight Bd., supra note 45, at tbl.4 (observing that "belief that your
neighbors are reporting and paying honestly" ranked last among reasons given by
respondents).
48. See Susan K. Laury & Laura 0. Taylor, Altruism Spillovers: Are Behaviors in
Context-Free Experiments Predictive of Altruism Toward a Naturally Occurring Public
Good?, 65J. Econ. Behav. & Org. 9, 28 (2008) (concluding that "altruistic behavior in the
laboratory can be predictive of contributions to naturally occurring public goods, but not
in a uniform manner").
49. See Nicholas Bardsley & Rupert Sausgruber, Conformity and Reciprocity in Public
Good Provision, 26J. Econ. Psychol. 664, 665-67 (2005) (finding that conformity-rather
than reciprocity-accounts for about one-third of cooperative actions in a public good
game).
50. Considerable experimental evidence suggests that forty percent to sixty percent of
people are contingent reciprocators. See, e.g., Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter, Reciprocity
and Economics: The Economic Implications of Homo Reciprocans, 42 Eur. Econ. Rev.
845, 847 (1998).
51. See Robert A. Kagan, On the Visibility of Income Tax Law Violations, in 2
Taxpayer Compliance: Social Sciences Perspectives 76, 94 (Jeffrey A. Roth & John T.
Scholz eds., 1989). Similarly, consider the following statement by a computer consultant:
"The whole consultancy requires integrity and honesty... if you were detected evading it
would be damaging to your business, so it's not worth it." Maria Sigala et al., Tax
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Internal Revenue Code, but be mortified by the possibility of telling the
CFO that the company must restate its earnings because of tax adjust-
ments. 5 2 Thus, not only is there strong evidence that many taxpayers act
nonrationally, but even fully rational taxpayers are not necessarily
gamers.
In sum, gamers are a fairly narrow group-they are rational taxpay-
ers whose marginal compliance decisions are made primarily based on
the expected tax penalty calculation. 53 Non-gainers, in contrast, are a
broad category that includes reciprocators, rational taxpayers motivated
by factors other than expected tax penalties, and those complying out of
habit, a sense of duty, a desire to avoid feelings of guilt or shame, and for
other irrational reasons. Yet our tax enforcement is built on the assump-
tion that everyone is a gamer.54 No wonder progress in improving tax
compliance has been slow.
C. The Tax Enforcement Conundrum
Scholars have long recognized that existing expected penalties are
wholly inadequate to deter gamers.5 5 Overall compliance is relatively
high only because major sources of income (such as salaries, dividends,
and interest) are subject to withholding, information reporting, or both.
When neither mechanism is practical or politically acceptable, compli-
ance rates decline. 56 This is hardly a surprise. Audit rates are exceed-
Communication and Social Influence: Evidence from a British Sample, 9J. Community &
Applied Soc. Psychol. 237, 239 (1999).
52. "Accounting for income taxes was the top reason for adverse audit opinions and
restatements during 2005 and 2006. It's also currently the highest risk area of financial
reporting and it's causing quite a stir within audit committees and the C-suite." Bob
Norton, A Practical Approach to Tax Governance, Investment Dealer's Dig., Apr. 23, 2007,
at 18, 18.
53. Note that "narrow" in this context is not synonymous with "small."
54. This is a bit of an overstatement. The IRS does have several programs based on
cooperation with taxpayers rather than deterrence, including the Prefiling Agreement
Program, the Advance Pricing Agreement Program, the Compliance Assurance Program,
and the Joint Audit Planning Program. See Amy S. Elliott, IRS Evolves to Meet Challenges
of Global Tax Environment, 121 Tax Notes 898, 898-99 (2008) (discussing potential use of
these programs in context of multinational enterprises). Nevertheless, these deviations
from the one-size-fits-all approach treating everyone as a gamer are minor compared to the
potential reforms discussed in this Article. For instance, the Compliance Assurance
Program involves only 94 taxpayers, see id., and merely 773 advance pricing agreements
have been completed since the program began in 1991. Lisa M. Nadal, Nearly 800 APAs
Completed Since Program Began, IRS Says, 118 Tax Notes 1365, 1365 (2008).
55. For a numerical example showing that at a 2% audit rate (an unrealistically high
audit rate for individuals), an adequate penalty based on the deterrence model is 4900%,
see Lederman, supra note 2, at 1464-65.
56. "The IRS reports that the net misreporting rate is 53.9, 8.5, and 4.5 percent for
income types subject to 'little or no,' 'some,' and 'substantial' information reporting,
respectively, and is just 1.2 percent for those amounts subject to both withholding and




ingly low and have been falling for decades. 57 Granted, the probability of
punishment that matters is the perceived rather than the actual one.
Some evidence suggests that many taxpayers overestimate the likelihood
that their tax returns will be examined. 58 Yet those with the largest op-
portunity to evade have the most realistic view of audit coverage. 59 Un-
derstanding the exceedingly favorable odds of playing the audit lottery,
and being aware of very modest statutory fines,60 these taxpayers pay very
little tax. If everyone were a garner, we would at least have a clear idea
about how to strengthen deterrence. 61 The fact that many taxpayers do
not fit the gamer mold makes things considerably more complex.
57. See Jeffrey A. Dubin et al., The Changing Face of Tax Enforcement, 1978-1988,
43 Tax Law. 893, 896-97 (1990) [hereinafter Dubin et al., Changing Face] (noting that
audit rate fell from over 6% in 1965 to roughly 2% in 1978, and to 1% by 1988); Slemrod,
Cheating Ourselves, supra note 4, at 38 ("Between 1996 and 2004, the share of
nonbusiness individual returns audited dropped from 1.67 percent to 0.74 percent.").
58. See Andreoni et al., supra note 4, at 844 (describing one study indicating that
people "greatly overestimate" their probability of audit); Grasmick & Scott, Tax Evasion,
supra note 13, at 222 (reporting that 37.9% of respondents believed they "probably or
definitely would be caught if they engaged in tax evasion"); Scholz & Pinney, supra note
17, at 497-99 (finding mean estimate of probability of being caught by IRS is 48%, with
standard deviation of 29%).
59. See Andreoni et al., supra note 4, at 844 n.75 (citing study showing "significant
positive correlation between subjective and objective measures" of audit probability among
a subset of better-informed taxpayers); Scholz & Pinney, supra note 17, at 507 (reporting
that an increase in subjective probability of getting caught for "tempted" taxpayers with
good opportunities to cheat closely tracks an increase in actual audit probability); Loretta
J. Stalans et al., When Do We Think About Detection? Structural Opportunity and
Taxpaying Behavior, 14 Law & Soc. Inquiry 481, 495 (1989) (determining that
"[i]ndividuals with high structural opportunity perceived significantly lower likelihood that
the IRS would detect underreporting income or overstating deductions than did
individuals with low or medium structural opportunity").
60. For a discussion of existing statutory penalties for tax noncompliance, see, for
example, Raskolnikov, Self-Adjusting Penalty, supra note 6, at 581-83.
61. Whether a substantial across-the-board increase in penalties and audit rates is
realistic as a political matter is another question. See, e.g., Joseph Bankman, Eight Truths
About Collecting Taxes from the Cash Economy, 117 Tax Notes 506, 514-15 (2007)
[hereinafter Bankman, Eight Truths] (reporting that "[iun California, at least, folks who
are otherwise enthusiastic about reducing the tax gap become much less so when they are
told that audits and greater use of penalties may play a role"); Graetz & Wilde, supra note
9, at 358 ("[A] large increase in the applicable sanction in light of the very low probability
of its application quickly becomes irrelevant as a policy matter. In this country, at least,
legal, moral and political constraints make this necessarily so."); see also Slemrod,
Cheating Ourselves, supra note 4, at 43 (suggesting that popular notion that punishment
should fit the crime may make courts reluctant to apply draconian penalties needed to
assure appropriate level of deterrence). Yet it is surely worth remembering that not so
long ago audit rates used to be ten times higher than what they are today. Compare Dubin
et al., Changing Face, supra note 57, at 898 (reporting that audit rate for high-income
returns was over 10% in 1978), with Allen Kenney, Everson Touts Increased IRS
Enforcement in Fiscal 2004, 105 Tax Notes 1071, 1071 tbl.1 (2004) (reporting that field
audit rate of high-income individuals was 0.53% in 2004, and combined field and
correspondence audit rate of high-income individuals was as low as 0.79% in 2001).
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Audits are expensive. They consume government resources and tax-
payers' time and energy. If an audited taxpayer pays her taxes out of a
sense of duty or reciprocity, to take two examples, an audit is not a partic-
ularly effective policy instrument. First, this taxpayer is much less likely
than a gamer to take a questionable or illegal position. Thus, most audits
of duty- or reciprocity-bound taxpayers will produce no adjustments. Sec-
ond, if this taxpayer underpays her taxes, she is almost certain to do so by
mistake. No doubt, collecting mistakenly unpaid taxes increases govern-
ment revenues and may induce the taxpayer to be more careful in the
future. Yet an audit of a duty- or reciprocity-bound taxpayer will not pro-
duce the large indirect deterrent effect often emphasized by academics
and government officials, 62 at least not among other like-minded individ-
uals. Those who pay taxes for reasons other than the fear of punishment
cannot be induced to comply by strengthening this fear.
Furthermore, the kind of audit required to deter a gamer is very dif-
ferent from that needed to strengthen voluntary compliance. The coop-
erative, problem-solving, even forgiving approach critical to maintaining
positive attitudes toward the tax law among non-gainers is, at best, wasted
on gamers. More realistically, this approach reduces their compliance by
lowering the likelihood (perhaps actual, and certainly perceived) that a
violation will be detected during an examination. 63 At the same time, the
adversarial, formalistic, even inquisitorial audits needed to deter gainers
may alienate non-gainers, undermining voluntary compliance. 6 4 Neither
approach works well for all taxpayers.
65
62. See, e.g., Dubin et al., Changing Face, supra note 57, at 904 (estimating ratio of
indirect to direct effect of doubling audit rate as 5:1); Jeffrey A. Dubin, Criminal
Investigation Enforcement Activities and Taxpayer Noncompliance, 35 Pub. Fin. Rev. 500,
519 (2007) (estimating same ratio as about 15:1).
63. The strong emphasis on taxpayer service and shift away from deterrence that
followed the 1997 congressional hearings was probably a factor (if not a major factor) in
the wave of tax shelters of the late 1990s and early 2000s. See, e.g., Jon Almeras, IRS
Restructuring: Ten Years Later, 120 Tax Notes 281, 281 (2008) (suggesting that "the
accusations against the IRS [made at the 1997 hearings] were overblown and that the
restructuring gutted the agency's enforcement efforts").
64. For anecdotal evidence of crowding out of voluntary compliance by unusually
thorough audits, see John Braithwaite, Through the Eyes of the Advisers: A Fresh Look at
High Wealth Individuals, in Taxing Democracy, supra note 2, at 245, 248-49 [hereinafter
Braithwaite, High Wealth Individuals].
65. In a certain sense, the government's auditing strategy is already not uniform. For
instance, the IRS has increased audit rates for some narrow categories of taxpayers based
on their observable characteristics. The compliance rate for small businesses is much
lower than for salaried employees, so the IRS pays particular attention to the former. In
2001, for instance, total audit coverage for all individual returns without business income
(Schedule C) was 0.51%, while it was 1.55% for individual returns with business income.
See Slemrod, Small Business, supra note 2, at 92. Similarly, returns that raise "red flags"
are examined more often than the rest. The IRS uses a secret "discriminant index
function" to identify suspect returns. See Dubin et al., Changing Face, supra note 57, at
900. These audit selection strategies are reasonable, but they miss the larger point. They
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Raising penalties across the board leads to similar problems. Tax law
is notoriously complex and ambiguous. What seems to be a clear rule in
one section of the Code may be overridden by an obscure provision in a
different part of the tax statute. 66 Some transactions have no clear tax
treatment at all. 6 7 Even when dealing with straightforward rules, auditors
make mistakes, and so do taxpayers. For all these reasons, even those
whose tax positions are uncontroversial (or only mildly aggressive) worry
about being penalized. The resulting risk-bearing losses-a form of
deadweight loss-reduce social welfare. 68 The higher the statutory penal-
ties, the larger these losses.
High fines lead to other social costs as well. They result in more
vigorous resistance from offenders, longer trials, higher attorney fees,
and so on.6 9 For gainers, higher penalties at least produce an offsetting
social benefit of stronger deterrence. 70 But for non-gainers no such ben-
efit exists. Thus, a dramatic increase in statutory fines is particularly inef-
ficient if many taxpayers are not trying to game the system.
If incurring the social costs of higher fines without improving tax
compliance does not seem like a good idea, doing the same while decreas-
ing compliance is clearly a bad one. Yet this is precisely what happens if
the vast empirical literature describing the so-called crowding out effect
reflects taxpayer behavior. Sanctions introduced into a game environ-
ment dominated by contingent reciprocators crowd out voluntary compli-
ance, turning some reciprocators into rational utility maximizers. 7 1 Mate-
aim to create appropriate incentives for garners, but fail to address the fundamental
difference in taxpaying motivations between garners and everyone else.
66. For instance, neither section 1222, providing the rules for calculations of capital
losses, nor section 1211, containing limitations on deductible losses and found in the same
subchapter of the Code, makes any mention of the straddle rules of section 1092, which
limit capital losses that may be deducted in any given year. See I.R.C. §§ 1092, 1211, 1222
(2006).
67. Widely used financial instruments that have no clear tax treatment include so-
called variable delivery prepaid forwards and credit default swaps. See Jeremiah Coder,
Treasury, IRS Officials Clarify Financial Guidance Comments, 117 Tax Notes 436, 436
(2007) (noting that Treasury Department intends to provide additional guidance
regarding treatment of such instruments).
68. See, e.g., Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and
Administration, in 3 Handbook of Public Economics 1423, 1449 (Alan J. Auerbach &
Martin Feldstein eds., 2002) (explaining that risk-bearing costs borne by tax evaders
worrying about possible penalties are deadweight loss).
69. Richard Craswell, Damage Multipliers in Market Relationships, 25 J. Legal Stud.
463, 468-70 (1996).
70. For an explanation of the relationship between risk-bearing losses and deterrence,
see A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Optimal Tradeoff Between the Probability
and Magnitude of Fines, 69 Am. Econ. Rev. 880 (1979) [hereinafter Polinsky & Shavell,
Optimal Tradeoff].
71. E.g., Ernst Fehr & Arrmin Falk, Psychological Foundations of Incentives, 46 Eur.
Econ. Rev. 687, 693-98 (2002) (discussing experimental results showing that "voluntary
cooperation is substantially and significantly weakened by the availability or actual use of
[an] incentive"); Mark Lubell & John T. Scholz, Cooperation, Reciprocity, and the
Collective-Action Heuristic, 45 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 160, 173-74 (2001) (finding that
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rial rewards consistently undermine people's "intrinsic motivation" to
perform individual tasks. 72 Crowding out has been observed in a variety
of real-life settings, with effects as diverse as late pickups of children from
day care centers, 73 deteriorated blood donations, 74 diminished effort in
performing volunteer work, 75 and overharvesting of common natural re-
sources. 76 In each case, the introduction of negative (and even positive)
material incentives led to reduced cooperation, decreased effort, or di-
minished compliance. There are reasons to believe that crowding out is a
real concern in tax enforcement.
77
That deterrence-based approaches such as penalties and audits fail
to improve the compliance of non-gainers hardly means that nothing else
does. Scholars have suggested a number of measures that should have a
positive effect on these taxpayers, including: stressing the high degree of
overall tax compliance; 78 highlighting the large tax burden borne by the
wealthy;79 informing taxpayers that most of their fellow citizens have
introduction of penalties into nice, reciprocal environments reduces cooperation, while
also diminishing deterrent effect of penalties compared to nonreciprocal environments);
Ann E. Tenbrunsel & David M. Messick, Sanctioning Systems, Decision Frames, and
Cooperation, 44 Admin. Sci. Q. 684, 691-94 (1999) (reporting that introducing infrequent
inspections and small fines reduces both cooperation and expectation of cooperation).
72. See Edward L. Deci et al., A Meta-Analytic Review of Experiments Examining the
Effects of Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation, 125 Psychol. Bull. 627, 658 (1999);
Fehr & Falk, supra note 71, at 713-16 (discussing crowding out phenomenon, and noting
that negative impact of reward on intrinsic motivation is consistent regardless of whether
reward is engagement contingent, completion contingent, or performance contingent).
73. See Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, 29 J. Leg. Stud. 1, 3 (2000)
(reporting that introduction of small fines for late child pickups from daycare increased
number of late pickups, destroying informal norm against being late).
74. See Richard M. Titmuss, The Gift of Blood, in Philosophy of Welfare 170 (Brian
Abel-Smith & Kay Titmuss eds., 1987) (stressing that offering monetary compensation for
blood donations undermines the sense of civic duty, leading to decreased quality of
donated blood).
75. See Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, Pay Enough or Don't Pay at All, 115 Q.J. Econ.
791, 791, 794-95 (2000) (finding that performance varies in nonmonotonic ways with
incentives, including a decline in performance when incentives are small compared to
when they are absent).
76. See Elinor Ostrom, Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms, J. Econ.
Persp., Summer 2000, at 137, 149-51 (reporting results of study of irrigation systems in
India, where lower levels of voluntary cooperation with water management rules were
observed in systems with significant government intervention).
77. See, e.g., Richard D. Schwartz & Sonya Orleans, On Legal Sanctions, 34 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 274, 299-300 (1967) ("The threat of punishment appears ... to produce some
resistance to compliance.").
78. See Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law,
102 Mich. L. Rev. 71, 83 (2003) (discussing Minnesota Department of Revenue study in
which taxpayers were informed that actual compliance rates were much higher than
commonly believed).
79. See Peggy A. Hite, An Investigation of Moral Suasion and Vertical Equity
Arguments on Intended Taxpayer Noncompliance, 19 Law & Pol'y 1, 7, 14 (1997)
(reporting that "vertical equity" arguments were more effective in improving compliance
of experimental subjects with balances due than those owed refunds).
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strong, negative views of tax evasion;" ° emphasizing the value of govern-
ment programs and their connection to tax dollars;8 1 providing taxpayers
with helpful, readily available advice;8 2 assuring nonadversarial, respect-
ful treatment on audit;83 and creating positive incentives for compliant
taxpayers.8 4 Granted, some of these strategies may be better tailored to
one type of non-gamers (for instance, reciprocators), while other mea-
sures may work better for other types (such as duty-bound individuals or
habitual compliers). Yet as far as we know, all of these policy instruments
are at least somewhat effective in facilitating the compliance of most non-
gamers.
8 5
Nonetheless, it is far from clear that the government should pursue
these cooperative enforcement strategies in the current enforcement en-
vironment. First, these measures are likely to embolden gainers. "If this
is how the government plans to enforce its tax laws," gainers will think,
"we can avoid and evade with impunity. 8s 6 Second, empirical evidence
about the effectiveness of these approaches is speculative, sparse, and de-
cidedly mixed. 87 This should be expected if the tested population in-
80. See Wenzel, Misperceptions, supra note 44, at 877 (demonstrating that letters
informing taxpayers that they are mistaken in thinking that others believe tax cheating to
be more acceptable than they view it themselves have positive effect on tax compliance).
81. See Robert Kidder & Craig McEwen, Taxpaying Behavior in Social Context: A
Tentative Typology of Tax Compliance and Noncompliance, in 2 Taxpayer Compliance:
Social Sciences Perspectives, supra note 51, at 47, 63-64 (discussing potential of campaign
to publicize "benefits and protections" paid for by taxes, particularly if targeted at certain
kinds of taxpayers).
82. See Michael Wenzel, Tax Compliance and the Psychology ofJustice: Mapping the
Field, in Taxing Democracy, supra note 2, at 41, 55 [hereinafter Wenzel, Mapping the
Field] (reporting studies showing that taxpayers value access to, and provision of,
information by the Australian Tax Office).
83. See Feld & Frey, supra note 10, at 106-08 (arguing that respectful treatment by
tax authorities leads to higher compliance, "particularly in [Swiss] cantons using
referendums and initiatives in political decision-making"); Sheffrin & Triest, supra note 44,
at 207 ("[H]earing reports of bad behavior by the IRS lowers the perceived fairness of the
tax system and reported future compliance.").
84. See Kent W. Smith, Reciprocity and Fairness: Positive Incentives for Tax
Compliance, in Why People Pay Taxes, supra note 32, at 223, 246 (concluding from data
that "responsive service and procedural fairness are positive incentives that affect
normative commitments to tax compliance").
85. These measures have been shown to improve tax compliance (or, more generally,
law obedience and cooperation), yet they do not alter the rational calculus of garners.
Therefore, they must appeal to non-gamers.
86. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (tracing prevalence of tax shelters in
late 1990s and early 2000s in part to increased emphasis on respectful treatment rather
than deterrence).
87. For example, analysis of a single experiment involving responses of real taxpayers
led one group of researchers to conclude that moral appeals have no effect on tax
compliance while another commentator reached the opposite conclusion. Compare
Marsha Blumenthal et al., Do Normative Appeals Affect Tax Compliance? Evidence from a
Controlled Experiment in Minnesota, 54 Nat'l Tax J. 125, 131-32 (2001) (finding no
statistically significant effects from normative appeals), with Stephen Coleman, Minnesota
Dep't of Revenue, The Minnesota Income Tax Compliance Experiment 18-19 (1996),
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cludes both garners and non-gamers. Third, if one takes a dynamic view
of tax administration, as Dan Kahan pointed out, the choice of enforce-
ment policies depends critically on the reasons for the existing level of
compliance. If most taxpayers are currently deterred by the fear of sanc-
tions (i.e., most are garners), only stronger deterrence will produce posi-
tive results. If contingent reciprocators and other non-garners
predominate, stronger deterrence will have the opposite effect.88 While
the first scenario appears unlikely in light of existing statutory penalties
and audit rates, no one really knows.
In sum, the tax administrator faces a conundrum. While a number
of policy instruments are available, applying any given one to the entire
taxpayer population is ineffective, inefficient, or both. How can this co-
nundrum be resolved?
D. Targeting Enforcement to Resolve the Conundrum
The answer appears close to the surface. There are (very roughly)
two types of taxpayers: garners and everyone else. We have a clear under-
standing of deterrence-based approaches that are effective with garners.
We also have a reasonably good grasp of the cooperative enforcement
strategies that are likely to be successful with other taxpayers. Each set of
strategies, however, gives rise to social costs when applied to the "wrong"
category of actors and may reduce compliance of individuals in that
category.
What we need is to match enforcement strategies with taxpayer
types-to target tax enforcement. We can do this only if we design a sys-
tem that accomplishes two goals. First, it must compel each taxpayer to
choose her type-gamer or non-gamer. Second, it must force each tax-
payer to reveal her chosen type to the government. Once the IRS in-
duces taxpayers to reveal their choices, it can facilitate a separation be-
tween gamers and non-garners and target enforcement by applying
deterrence-based measures to garners and cooperative enforcement strat-
egies to everyone else. Designing a mechanism that will allow the govern-
ment to achieve this separation and targeting is not easy. The benefits of
successfully doing so, however, should be great.
The most obvious advantage of separating garners from the rest-
assuming for the moment that it can be accomplished effectively-is that
strengthening deterrence becomes less inefficient if only garners are in-
volved. Because a targeted enforcement regime will apply high statutory
fines only to garners, the number of taxpayers affected by these fines will
be relatively low. Non-gamers will not be exposed to large penalties and
available at http://www.taxes.state.mn.us/taxes/legal_policy/research-reports/content/
complnce.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (finding statistically significant effect
based on the same data set). For an explanation of this inconsistency, see Lederman,
supra note 2, at 1474 n.112.
88. See Kahan, Trust, supra note 5, at 345-46.
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will not incur high risk-bearing costs. They (and society) will also save
additional expenses related to more contentious audits and longer trials
that accompany highly punitive sanctions.
Another benefit of separating taxpayers by type is less tangible. It is
well understood that increasing the visibility of tax enforcement is a
double-edged sword. On the one hand, publicizing tax prosecutions,
highlighting new and larger penalties, and trumpeting increased audit
rates informs the public that the government is vigilant in collecting tax
revenues.8 9 In economic terms, these measures increase the expected
cost of noncompliance by raising the perceived probability of detection
and, perhaps, informing rational individuals about the true magnitude of
nominal fines. On the other hand, this kind of publicity backfires. It
reminds taxpayers that many among them-including the rich and fa-
mous-disregard their tax obligations, often by hiring expensive tax advi-
sors available only to the wealthy. It also raises the specter of an oppres-
sive tax collector dead set on intervening in personal affairs of law-
abiding citizens. Whether these taxpayers are reciprocators or those in-
trinsically motivated by duty, patriotism, or a desire to avoid feelings of
guilt, their motivation to cooperate and comply may well be crowded out
by highly public tax enforcement. 90
This problem will be solved if taxpayers are sorted based on their
taxpaying motivations. Only tax enforcement against gainers will be
highly public. Non-gamers will not be disappointed by the existence of
aggressive tax avoiders because those avoiders will live by a different set of
rules. They will not be a part of the ingroup to which non-gamers be-
long, so their well-publicized punishment will provide non-gamers with
no reason to suspect that their fellow non-ganers are abusing the
system.
9 1
89. For a list of high-profile taxpayers prosecuted for tax evasion, see Dubin et al.,
Changing Face, supra note 57, at 906; see also David Cay Johnston, Wesley Snipes Is
Charged with Tax Fraud, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 2006, at E3; Floyd Norris, KPMG, a Proud
Old Lion, Brought to Heel, N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 2005, at Cl.
90. See, e.g., Schwartz & Orleans, supra note 77, at 276-77 (noting that some
instances of tax evasion begin after widely-publicized prosecutions, on the view that, "[i]f
that is the kind of thing the government waits for.., they'll never come after me" (internal
quotations omitted)); Sheffrin & Triest, supra note 44, at 211-14 ("Publicizing the 'tax
gap' increases the degree to which others are viewed as dishonest. Estimates ... suggest
that this shift in perceived honesty will result in an increase in noncompliance.").
91. For a discussion of the importance of group identification to tax compliance
decisions, see, for example, Taylor, supra note 25, at 74 ("It is when self-perception is at
the level of social identity, where greater similarity to ingroup others and greater
dissimilarity to outgroup others is perceived, that attitudes and behaviour become more
aligned with ingroup norms."); Michael Wenzel, An Analysis of Norm Processes in Tax
Compliance, 25 J. Econ. Psychol. 213, 216 (2004) ("[P]eople are more likely to be
influenced by others who are considered members of ... the group with which one
identifies in a given situation .... In contrast, when the influence source . . . is not part
of... the group.., one does not expect to agree with them because they are considered
'different."'); Wenzel, Mapping the Field, supra note 82, at 43 ("Most models of tax
evasion assume that taxpayers are motivated to maximise their individual outcomes; they
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Separating garners from other taxpayers will also allow the govern-
ment to conserve resources in facilitating voluntary compliance among
non-garners. Cooperative strategies aimed at providing rewards that are
likely to boost morale and encourage compliance of cooperative taxpay-
ers will be concentrated on these individuals. Garners who are either in-
different to such measures or view them as a sign of IRS weakness will be
insulated from accessing the benefits of cooperation.
Furthermore, separating-or even creating a perception of separat-
ing-gamers from non-gamers will resolve the seemingly insurmountable
problem of uncertainty regarding the predominant reason for existing
tax compliance. Because of this uncertainty, it is unclear whether more
deterrence or more cooperative enforcement is needed to improve com-
pliance under the current system. Once separation is achieved, that ques-
tion will become moot: Gamers will be forced to comply by stronger de-
terrence; all others will be induced to pay taxes by an emphasis on
cooperative enforcement.
Finally, if a taxpayer is subject to regulation by government agencies
other than the IRS, those agencies will be able to use the regulatee's re-
vealed tax type (gamer or non-gamer) in their non-tax enforcement ef-
forts. It appears reasonable to assume that if a company's managers pre-
fer to take aggressive tax positions, they are also more likely to take
aggressive positions with respect to financial accounting, securities disclo-
sure, anticompetitive activities, consumer safety studies, and the like. If
so, the benefits of deploying information-forcing mechanisms in one reg-
ulatory area (such as tax enforcement) may extend well beyond it, al-
lowing separation and targeted enforcement in other areas and produc-
ing large additional social savings.9 2 In fact, an intriguing research
project would involve determining which regulatory environment is par-
ticularly conducive to the introduction of features that will effectively and
cheaply separate gamers from non-garners. Once this environment was
found, other regulators (potentially including the IRS) could take advan-
tage of the resulting separation.
9 3
In sum, targeting can enable the government to increase deterrence
and improve voluntary compliance while reducing the social cost of tax
administration. It can also strengthen morale and eliminate the undesir-
able side effects of a uniform deterrence-based approach. This is an at-
tractive package. While, as far as I know, identifying these benefits and
proposing to capture them by separating gamers from the rest is new to
do not consider the possibility that taxpayers define themselves as members of social
groups and act in terms of the interests and norms of their group and fellow group
members.").
92. Of course, if the assumption that a tax gamer is also a gamer in other regulatory
areas is mistaken, this strategy will not work.
93. An even more provocative question is whether private parties interacting with a
given taxpayer may find it useful to know whether this taxpayer is a gamer or non-gamer
for tax compliance purposes. That inquiry is beyond this Article's scope.
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the literature, the idea that the one-size-fits-all approach to tax adminis-
tration leaves much to be desired is not.94 Progress in designing tailored
solutions has remained slow, however, because recognizing the need for
targeted strategies is very different from developing them.95 Garners are
not going to reveal themselves in response to a government question-
naire. If they can gain advantage by masking their type, they will try to do
so. Moreover, people are complicated and may act as gainers in one set
of circumstances and as reciprocators in another.9 6 A viable system of
targeted tax enforcement must overcome all these complications.
II. REVEALING TAXPAYER MOTIVATIONS WITH A DuAL
ENFORCEMENT REGIME
This Part demonstrates how well-known approaches to mitigating in-
formation asymmetries can be used to compel taxpayers to reveal their
core motivations for complying with the tax law to the government. It
also emphasizes that the benefits of separation and targeted enforcement
are independent of the level of deterrence.
A. Penalty Default and Schedule Selection in Tax Administration
Two related mechanisms for inducing actors to reveal private infor-
mation are well understood. One solution is to impose a punitive default
and allow individuals to elect out of it in a way that produces information
about them. Another approach is to force actors to choose from a menu
of options structured in such a way that an actor's choice discloses salient
information about his preferences. In either case, agents are compelled
to choose a course of action and their choices produce information
sought by the principal. Agents' choices are revealing.
The best-known enunciation of the first idea comes from Ian Ayres
and Robert Gertner, who also coined the term "penalty default. '9 7 While
94. See, e.g., Feld & Frey, supra note 10, at 104 ("Thoughts on the impact of
deterrence and rewards on tax compliance highlight the importance of a differentiated
approach."); Kidder & McEwen, supra note 81, at 63 ("[B]y identifying particular types of
compliance and noncompliance and their social correlates, it may be possible to target
enforcement strategies to particular audiences .... "); Lubell & Scholz, supra note 71, at
176 (concluding that "[c]oercive institutions need to tailor enforcement to match the
social capital in different subpopulations," but acknowledging "difficulties in developing
such flexible enforcement institutions").
95. See, e.g., Slemrod, Cheating Ourselves, supra note 4, at 41 (emphasizing "[tihe
difficulties of separating out whether people pay their taxes because they feel they 'ought
to,' or whether they fear the penalties attendant to not doing so").
96. See, e.g., Braithwaite, Dancing, supra note 2, at 15, 21 (citing "evidence of
individuals simultaneously holding a conception of self as citizen who should pay taxes
with good grace, and a conception of self as a business adviser who makes a living out of
game playing on behalf of those who want to avoid their tax obligations"). For an
explanation of how this Article's proposal addresses motivational complexity, see infra text
accompanying notes 217-223.
97. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale LJ. 87, 97 (1989); see also Ian Ayres, Ya-Huh:
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Ayres and Gertner focused primarily on the exchange of information be-
tween private contractors, they recognized that the penalty default may
be used to force individuals to reveal information to government instru-
mentalities, specifically the courts.9 8
Bradley Karkkainen showed that administrative agencies may benefit
from a penalty default regime as well. 99 He demonstrated that subjecting
land developers to the highly restrictive "no take" provision of the
Endangered Species Act (the "regulatory penalty default"10 0 ) forced the
industry to develop solutions that, while satisfying the industry's needs,
were more beneficial to endangered species than preserving the status
quo. The developers-with an abundance of local knowledge, flexibility,
and creative thinking-were repeatedly able to generate ideas that would
have never occurred to Washington bureaucrats in the Department of the
Interior.101
Information asymmetry is at the center of the tax enforcement co-
nundrum. Taxpayers know (or at least can know) their taxpaying motiva-
tions, but the IRS does not. Can a penalty default regime reduce this
asymmetry just as it does in contract negotiations and environmental
regulation?
Attempting to adapt the penalty default idea to tax administration
runs into an immediate problem: Interactions between the IRS and tens
of millions of taxpayers are very different from the bilateral negotiations
of contractual counterparties or the ongoing give and take between the
Department of the Interior and private developers. Penalty defaults in
contract law force parties to reveal private information, but policymakers
and judges designing these defaults need not anticipate what this infor-
mation might happen to be in every case. The contractual counterparty
stands ready to respond to whatever information is revealed. Similarly,
the administrative agency in Karkkainen's example did not need to antici-
pate the innovative solutions of private developers. The Department of
the Interior needed only to create an incentive to develop solutions,
which it did by imposing a penalty default. But an agency that processes
over 130 million tax returns each year cannot react to individual taxpay-
ers' unique responses. If a penalty default is to be successful on that
scale, the government must define not just the punitive default regime,
but the alternative system as well, and it must do so in a way that will
produce critical information about taxpayers merely from their choice of
There Are and Should Be Penalty Defaults, 33 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 589 (2006). For earlier
formulations of the same idea, see Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Steven Shavell, Information
and the Scope of Liability for Breach of Contract: The Rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, 7 J.L.
Econ. & Org. 284 (1991); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An
Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 Yale LJ. 1261, 1299-1300 (1980).
98. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 97, at 97.
99. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Adaptive Ecosystem Management and Regulatory
Penalty Defaults: Toward a Bounded Pragmatism, 87 Minn. L. Rev. 943, 970-75 (2002).
100. Id. at 965.
101. See id. at 971-75.
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enforcement environment. In order to do so, the government must have
a clear idea about the information it is trying to obtain. As the analysis in
Part I of this Article suggests, the government should be seeking to un-
derstand taxpayer motivations.
This adaptation of the penalty default idea to tax enforcement brings
it very close to a second information-forcing mechanism: menus. Busi-
nesses use menus to pry information from their customers all the time.
Price discrimination is the clearest example.' 0 2 When a car company sells
its products under two different brands (such as Ford and Lincoln,
Toyota and Lexus, or Volkswagen and Audi), or when an airline or a
railroad offers seats in first, business, and economy classes, these busi-
nesses attempt to separate customers with a strong preference for luxury
from the rest. Theater and opera companies use a similar approach
when they discount matinee tickets compared to those for evening shows.
One of the most stark (and most despised) menu choices used to sepa-
rate business from non-business travelers is the so-called "Saturday night
stay" requirement imposed by many airlines. 10 3 To purchase cheaper
tickets, flyers are required to spend Saturday night at their destination.
Airlines assume that weary business travelers (or their employers) will pay
more to return home on Saturday while vacationers will spend an extra
day at their destinations to pay less. Forcing travelers to choose between
spending Saturday night at home or on the road enables airlines to learn
about each customer's type and her ability to pay higher prices.
10 4
If businesses use menus as information-revealing tools so widely,
surely the IRS can do so as well. In fact, mechanism design theory and,
more specifically, the so-called "schedule selection problem" provide a
theoretical foundation for this approach. Recent work suggests that in
many circumstances, "requiring agents with private information to select
from a menu of incentive schedules can yield efficiency gains" by allowing
the principal to screen agents more effectively. 10 5 One of the examples
102. I thank Scott Hemphill for this suggestion.
103. See, e.g., Scott McCartney, Airlines to Business Fliers: Pay More, Virginian-Pilot
(Norfolk), Aug. 24, 2008, at D2 (describing renewed effort by airlines to implement
requirement after previously abandoning it in the face of competition from low-cost
carriers). I am grateful to Dan Shaviro for this suggestion.
104. See id. ("For many years the Saturday-night requirement was a tactic airlines
used to separate business travelers from leisure customers. The Saturday-night stay forced
many business travelers to either pay hundreds of dollars more for each ticket, or to spend
an extra night or two on the road to save money.").
105. See Erzo F.P. Luttmer & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Schedule Selection by Agents:
From Price Plans to Tax Tables 1 (Feb. 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Columbia Law Review), available at http://www.nber.org/-uttmer/scheduleselection.pdf.
These gains arise
because the menu of schedules induces each type [of agent] to select the
schedule that contains relatively few distortions to the action that that type is
likely to take. In addition, a menu of schedules benefits the principal because it




used by Erzo Luttmer and Richard Zeckhauser to demonstrate the advan-
tages of multiple schedules is the U.S. tax system. This is hardly surpris-
ing. The central problem of the optimal tax theory is the information
asymmetry between taxpayers and the government. Ability-the ideal tax
base-cannot be taxed because individuals have no incentive to reveal
their ability to the tax collector. Using multiple schedules may provide a
partial solution to this problem, Luttmer and Zeckhauser show, by induc-
ing taxpayers to reveal their type (high or low ability) before they know
their actual ability precisely.
10 6
The tax enforcement conundrum exists for a very similar reason:
Taxpayers' types are critical private information that the government
does not possess. Therefore, a menu-or a choice of "enforcement
schedules" in lieu of the current one-size-fits-all approach-is likely to
produce welfare improvements by inducing taxpayers to reveal their types
before they know their precise tax situations in a given year and before
they decide what specific reporting positions to take.
How can the penalty default and schedule selection mechanisms be
used to separate taxpayers based on their taxpaying motivations? No
doubt, many possible strategies are available. This Article considers the
most basic one. The suggested strategy is simple for two reasons. First,
while taxpayers clearly think about tax compliance in a great variety of
ways, and while taxpayers could conceivably be sorted in multiple groups
reflecting this heterogeneity, I propose to divide all taxpayers into only
two groups: gamers and non-gamers. Thus, the suggested menu has the
fewest possible choices. Second, while two entirely new enforcement re-
gimes can be designed for gamers and non-garners, I suggest that one of
the regimes in the new dual structure should be essentially the same one
we have today. Therefore, only one new regime needs to be developed.
Evaluating the effectiveness and feasibility of this relatively simple reform
should shed considerable light on the use of more complicated informa-
tion-forcing mechanisms in tax (and, more generally, law) enforcement.
Because the current regime is deterrence oriented, I will call its
equivalent in the new dual structure the deterrence regime (DR).
Gamers respond well to deterrence, so the goal is to compel them to
choose DR. The second enforcement regime should be designed for
non-garners. Because these taxpayers are indifferent or averse to deter-
rence and responsive to cooperative enforcement, the second regime
should have lower statutory fines than those in DR.10 7 In addition, this
regime should emphasize taxpayer service and voluntary compliance. I
will refer to it as the compliance regime (CR). If the proposed strategy
106. Id.
107. If a taxpayer choosing DR is subject to regulations by government agencies other
than the IRS, and if the choice of a tax regime provides valuable information to these
other agencies as discussed above, see supra text accompanying notes 92-93, the cost of
electing DR may include not only higher expected tax penalties, but also additional
scrutiny from non-tax regulators.
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works, garners and non-garners will separate themselves into two enforce-
ment regimes, each designed for those taxpayers who choose it.
To accomplish this separation, CR should have a number of unique
features that satisfy three conditions. First, these features should be sub-
stantially more costly for garners than for other taxpayers, such that these
two broad categories of actors face different incentives when deciding
which regime to choose. Second, these CR features should be sufficiently
costly for garners to keep them in DR despite its higher nominal penal-
ties. Finally, these features should be few and simple enough to be
grasped by millions of taxpayers. Are there features that satisfy these re-
quirements? Before answering this question, it is important to take a
brief pause and refocus the analysis.
B. Targeting Versus Deterrence
Thus far, the discussion has been implicitly based on the premise
that tax enforcement needs to be strengthened by increasing deterrence
for those who respond to it without imposing high costs on others and
without interfering with their reasons to comply. While I hold this view, it
is important to emphasize that targeting-and not stronger deterrence--is at
the core of this Article's inquiry. The two are not interconnected.
Targeted tax enforcement is likely to be superior to the current one-size-
fits-all approach-producing higher compliance at a lower social cost-at
any given level of deterrence.
Thus, if stronger deterrence is desirable, we should increase nominal
civil penalties in DR (perhaps significantly) compared to what they are
today.1 0 8 In theory, deterrence may also be strengthened by setting audit
rates in DR higher than in CR. However, for the reasons that become
clear once the proposal is fully analyzed, audit rates should not vary be-
tween the regimes.
1 0 9
If, on the other hand, the current level of deterrence is viewed as
acceptable, nominal DR penalties need not be higher than they are to-
day. What is important is that these penalties are substantially higher
than those in CR. Thus, even if one thinks that the existing state of tax
compliance is just about right, it still makes sense to consider the pro-
posed dual regime framework. In that case, statutory fines in DR will be
relatively low (for instance, the same as now), while fines in CR will be
108. Reasons to limit the proposed dual regime to civil violations are discussed below.
See infra Part IV.B.2.
109. See infra Part V.C. In that respect, the proposal corresponds to the original
idea expressed by Gary Becker, who argued that nominal penalties rather than detection
efforts should be used to adjust deterrence. See Becker, supra note 14, at 193; Louis
Kaplow, The Optimal Probability and Magnitude of Fines for Acts that Definitely Are
Undesirable, 12 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 3, 3 (1992) (referring to idea as a "well-known
suggestion"); Polinsky & Shavell, Optimal Tradeoff, supra note 70, at 880 n.3 (reciting
argument and listing commentators who accepted it).
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even lower (or, perhaps, there will be no fines at all). The social benefits
of separation and targeting will obtain in this case as well.
III. DESIGNING THE COMPLIANCE REGIME
Relatively high nominal sanctions in DR will nudge all taxpayers to-
ward the alternative, lower-penalty regime. Yet to capture the benefits of
targeted enforcement, only non-garners should choose CR. This Part
considers a number of potential separation-inducing CR features. Some
of these features are suggested by a more nuanced consideration of the
familiar expected penalty formula; others emerge from an inquiry that
goes beyond the confines of the traditional deterrence model. The point
of the analysis is not to make a specific proposal, but to evaluate whether
the dual enforcement regime in tax administration is feasible, and, if so,
what features it might have.
A. Conceptualizing the Compliance Regime
The basic expected penalty calculation discounts nominal penalties
by the probability that these penalties will actually be imposed (the
probability of punishment). Two of the three prominent traditional en-
forcement measures-statutory sanctions and audits-are directly related
to this calculation. 1 0 Statutory sanctions are synonymous with nominal
penalties.11 Audits affect probability of punishment.
Conceivably, one may attempt to separate garners from non-garners
by varying just these two parameters. For instance, DR can have high
(higher than now) nominal penalties, but low (same as now) audit rates.
CR then should have the opposite combination: low (same as now) pen-
alties and high (higher than now) audit rates. If the resulting expected
penalties in DR are slightly lower than in CR, garners will choose DR.
Assuming that the voluntary compliance of many non-garners will be
crowded out by large sanctions but not by more frequent audits, this sim-
ple solution could be quite effective.
It is unclear, however, how pervasive crowding out is, or to what ex-
tent non-gainers are less averse to audits than to fines.1 12 What is clear is
110. The third traditional enforcement measure involves constraining opportunities
to underpay tax.
111. This is true as long as only civil violations are considered.
112. There is some evidence suggesting that intrusive detection efforts crowd out
voluntary compliance. See, e.g., Braithwaite, High Wealth Individuals, supra note 64, at
248-49 (describing response of one Australian taxpayer to more intrusive measures as, "if
the [tax authority] thinks I'm ripping the system off, maybe I should start doing it"
(internal quotations omitted)); Tenbrunsel & Messick, supra note 71, at 703-04
(concluding that surveillance and sanctioning regimes with low probability of detection
and weak fines may reduce voluntary cooperation, and regimes with higher probabilities of




that taxpayers of all stripes resent being audited.' 13 Audits are also costly
for the government. 1' 4 If decades of stagnant or falling audit rates sug-
gest anything, it is that a substantial increase in audit coverage is highly
unlikely. 15 Finally, the government has been extremely secretive about
its audit strategies. 1 16 If these strategies remain unknown or highly ob-
scure, it is unclear how gainers and non-gainers would respond to
changes in audit rates, if at all. For all these reasons, it is worth consider-
ing whether other features of the expected penalty calculation may be
adjusted to separate gainers from the rest.
This requires a more detailed analysis of expected penalties. Both
the probability of punishment and the nominal fine need to be disaggre-
gated. Probability of punishment is a combination of (at least) three dif-
ferent probabilities. First is the probability of audit, PA. Second is the (con-
ditional) probability that once a return is audited, the aggressive position
will be detected. This is the probability of detection, PD. Third is the (condi-
tional) probability that once a return is audited and the possible under-
statement is detected, the IRS will assert a deficiency and prevail in court
(including on appeal). I will call this the probability of conviction, Pc. Thus,
the expected payment, EP(tax), of an understated tax liability, T, may be
expressed as follows:
EP(tax) = PA x PD x Pc x T
Assume (consistent with actual U.S. tax law) that tax fines are calcu-
lated as a percentage, f of the underlying tax underpayment,' 17 so the
absolute amount of fine is f x T. Not every underpayment of tax triggers
imposition of a penalty.' 18 The probability offine, Pr, is a (conditional1 19 )
probability that the IRS will assert a penalty and prevail in court (includ-
ing on appeal) not only on the substantive issue, but with respect to the
penalty imposition as well. Therefore, the expected penalty with respect
to the underpaid tax liability, EP(penalty), is:
EP(penalty) = PAX PD X Pc X T X PFX f
113. For a description of persistent taxpayer resistance to audits, see Bankman, Eight
Truths, supra note 61, at 514-15; Raskolnikov, Self-Adjusting Penalty, supra note 6, at 595.
114. See Raskolnikov, Self-Adjusting Penalty, supra note 6, at 595-96 ("[C]urrent
audit costs are so significant and the budgetary constraints so great that one of the IRS's
latest objectives is to reduce the time spent on each audit.").
115. Others agree. See, e.g., Bankman, Eight Truths, supra note 61, at 516
("Expanding audits would require political support we do not now have.").
116. See Raskolnikov, Self-Adjusting Penalty, supra note 6, at 590 ("Audit strategies
such as the audit selection formulas are among the IRS's most closely guarded secrets.").
117. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6662(a) (2006) (imposing accuracy-related penalty equal to
twenty percent of underpayment); § 6663 (imposing fraud penalty equal to seventy-five
percent of portion of underpayment attributable to fraud).
118. See, e.g., § 6662(b) (conditioning imposition of penalty on negligence,
disregard of rules and regulations, etc.); § 6664(c) (stating exception to accuracy- and
fraud-related penalties where taxpayer had "reasonable cause" and acted in good faith with
respect to a tax position).
119. I will omit the term "conditional" for the remainder of the discussion.
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We can now combine the expressions for the expected tax payment
and the expected penalty payment into a single formula for the expected
payment, EP:
EP = EP(tax) + EP(penalty) = PAx PDx Pc x T X (I + PF x f)
This expanded expected payment formula reveals that the govern-
ment may have many more ways to separate gainers from non-gamers
than by varying nominal sanctions (f) and audit rates (PA). 12 0 Further-
more, some promising strategies are unrelated to the expected payment
calculation. All of these strategies are considered next.
B. Increasing the Probability of Conviction
Probability of conviction for tax noncompliance depends primarily
on the aggressiveness of a given position. Not all gainers are equally ag-
gressive. Some underpay their taxes without any justification at all.
These are tax evaders.12 1 For instance, taxpayers who have offshore bank
accounts and check the box on their returns stating precisely the oppo-
site belong to this category. The same is true of "informal suppliers" such
as street vendors and household workers who fail to report their cash
earnings. 122 Probability of conviction for tax evasion is close to one (or
100%). A fine may or may not be imposed, t 23 but an evader is all but
certain to pay his tax liability if the violation is detected on audit.
The same is clearly not true of taxpayers taking aggressive but (more
or less) defensible positions. These are tax avoiders. The more sophisti-
cated among them use third parties to develop and implement questiona-
ble strategies. Some pay millions of dollars for highly complex tax shel-
ters based on financial engineering and obscure provisions of the tax
law. 12 4 Others learn how to "push the envelope" from tax accountants
and preparers. The least sophisticated avoiders take aggressive reporting
positions all by themselves. They overstate the value of property contrib-
120. This basic model does not incorporate an additional cost arising due to risk-
bearing, even though I discuss risk-bearing losses throughout the paper. See, e.g., supra
text accompanying note 68. The omission is justified because I use this model in a very
limited way: (1) to structure the discussion of potential CR features by relating them to the
individual components of the model, and (2) to make a limited marginal deterrence point
that is not negated by omitting risk-bearing losses, see infra Part III.B.3.
121. For a discussion of the terminological confusion in descriptions of various forms
of tax noncompliance, and the suggestion to use the terms "evasion" and "avoidance" in
the manner described in the text, see Raskolnikov, Self-Adjusting Penalty, supra note 6, at
610.
122. The compliance rate for this category of taxpayers is only thirteen percent.
Slemrod, Small Business, supra note 2, at 84.
123. See infra text accompanying notes 136-140 (discussing current features of tax
litigation that make imposition of fines uncertain).
124. For a sample of the vast literature discussing the tax shelter problem, see, for
example, Joseph Bankman, The New Market in Corporate Tax Shelters, 83 Tax Notes 1775
(1999); Marvin A. Chirelstein & Lawrence A. Zelenak, Tax Shelters and the Search for a
Silver Bullet, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1939 (2005); Dvid P. Hariton, Kafka and the Tax Shelter,
57 Tax L. Rev. 1 (2003).
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uted to a charity (but do not make up the contribution itself), deduct
questionable (but plausible) "home office" expenses, 125 or write off so-
called "hobby losses" as business costs. 126 Whatever the level of sophisti-
cation, the tax avoidance game is always the same-adopt tax-reducing
positions that have some plausibility and hope that even if these positions
are audited and detected, the IRS will settle for a portion of the underly-
ing tax liability without assessing penalties. The less aggressive the posi-
tion, the lower the probability of conviction.
The two potential CR features discussed next change this calculus,
bringing the probability of conviction for tax avoiders close to one. The
result is a higher expected payment for avoiders without a substantial ad-
ditional burden on non-gainers.
1. The Pro-Government Presumption. - Tax avoidance critically de-
pends on the ambiguity of tax rules and unintended results of clear provi-
sions. Positions taken by tax avoiders-by definition-are neither clearly
right nor clearly wrong. The chance of success in litigation emboldens
these garners and makes it more likely that the IRS will settle a claim.
It is possible to change this state of affairs by tipping the scale in the
government's favor in CR. In general, the substantive tax law should be
the same in both regimes. However, taxpayers electing CR can be re-
quired to accept that it will be easier for the IRS to win disputes in that
regime than in DR. How this pro-government shift in burden is accom-
plished-and how dramatic the shift happens to be-is less important
than the shift itself. One possibility is that CR would contain a presump-
tion that the government's determination of tax liability is correct unless
proven otherwise by clear and convincing evidence. 127 Or there can be a
very strong general anti-avoidance rule requiring the adjudicator to use a
pro-government interpretation of the tax law. Another possibility would
be a presumption that the government's application of the existing extra-
statutory doctrines (such as substance-over-form and economic sub-
stance 28 ) is correct unless clearly erroneous. An even more far-reaching
CR rule would provide that all ambiguities (legal, factual, or both) in any
tax dispute will be resolved in favor of the government. 129 One way or
125. See, e.g., Popov v. Comm'r, 246 F.3d 1190, 1191-92 (9th Cir. 2001) (permitting
professional violinist to take home office deduction for portion of rent and utilities
allocated to apartment's living room, where she practiced).
126. See, e.g., Nickerson v. Comm'r, 700 F.2d 402, 405-08 (7th Cir. 1983) (allowing
taxpayer to deduct losses associated with operating farm in his spare time).
127. For the existing rules regarding burdens of proof, production, and persuasion in
just one possible venue for tax litigation (the U.S. Tax Court), see 4 Boris I. Bittker &
Lawrence Lokken, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts 115.4.2 (2d ed. 1992).
128. See, e.g.,Joseph Bankman, The Economic Substance Doctrine, 74 S. Cal. L. Rev.
5, 12 (2000) (discussing both doctrines).
129. For example, any time ajudge deciding a tax case is prepared to admit that the
"framework of statutes and regulations for deciding this case is simple, but not clear," Moss
v. Comm'r, 758 F.2d 211, 212 (7th Cir. 1985), the government would win. Courts deal with
ambiguity in tax law all the time. See, e.g., Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 390-91
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the other, the deck in any tax controversy will be stacked in the govern-
ment's favor.
This government-favoring rule will be costly for tax avoiders. Their
tax minimization strategies depend entirely on "gray areas" of the tax law,
and the pro-government presumption will eliminate (or significantly re-
duce) these gray areas. Of course, there will still be positions that favor
the taxpayer, but whose proper treatment is not quite certain-some am-
biguity will remain. Its extent, however, will be dramatically reduced.
How will the IRS-favoring presumption affect non-gamers? For
many, there will be no effect at all. Duty- and reciprocity-bound taxpayers
and even some rational actors are not interested in searching for loop-
holes and taking uncertain aggressive positions. If one is paying taxes to
support one's government, there is no point in taking positions that
would have been disallowed by Congress had it considered them in ad-
vance. If one is complying with the tax law based on a belief that others
are doing the same, one is not interested in finding strategies that others
are not using. And if one is a tax director concerned about restating cor-
porate earnings, the last thing on one's mind is adopting schemes that, if
detected on audit, will lead to a controversy with the IRS.
Granted, there are (and will continue to be) situations where the
proper tax treatment of a given transaction is not entirely clear. Yet non-
gamers choosing CR will face these situations infrequently because they
will not search for schemes designed to produce tax uncertainty. Where
uncertainty is inevitable, there will often be a conservative position that is
likely to be correct. Non-gamers taking this position will have nothing to
fear from the IRS. If the uncertainty is even more profound, then CR
features such as disclosure, prefiling advice, and cooperative, problem-
solving audits, discussed below, will give non-gamers several alternative
opportunities to resolve it. 130
The pro-government presumption will be costly for sophisticated and
unsophisticated avoiders alike, inducing them to avoid CR. However, this
presumption will not affect the cost-benefit calculus of evaders. As noted
above, the probability of conviction for evaders is close to one hundred
percent today, and it will remain so in DR. The pro-government pre-
sumption will assure that this probability is just as high (if not slightly
(1976) (addressing ambiguity in statutory provision barring state taxation of Indian
property); Merkel v. Comm'r, 192 F.3d 844, 848 (9th Cir. 1999) (construing code section
where key term, "liabilities," is undefined); Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. United
States, 927 F.2d 1517, 1526-27 (10th Cir. 1991) (pointing out that "[t]he law is unclear as
to the relationship between the step transaction doctrine and the business purpose
requirement").
130. See infra Part III.E.2. In addition, a taxpayer will always be able to take one of
several plausible positions that produces the smallest tax savings, even if this position is not
the one most likely to be correct. For instance, if position A is 40% likely to be correct and
favors the taxpayer, and positions B and C are each 30% likely to be correct and each
favors the government, the taxpayer may always choose either B or C and not worry about a
conflict with the IRS.
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higher) in CR. This virtual parity will not create an affirmative incentive
for evaders to choose DR over CR. Simply put, losing what evaders never
thought they had (a chance to prevail in litigation) will not be costly for
them.
2. Binding Arbitration with the IRS. - Adversarial litigation is central
to our legal system. It protects important values, especially if one of the
litigants is the federal government, as is the case in federal tax controver-
sies. Yet the ability to litigate helps aggressive taxpayers in many ways.
Sometimes, generalistjudges fall for taxpayer gimmicks. 13 1 Adherents to
literal methods of statutory interpretation occasionally adjudicate existing
extrastatutory anti-abuse doctrines out of existence.1 32 Fear of setting an
unfavorable precedent may stop the IRS from litigating a dispute in favor
of waiting for a stronger case. i 3 3 Those who can afford expensive legal
advice may outsmart and outmaneuver government litigators. 134 Tax
avoiders benefit from all these features of the existing regime.
Taxpayers who elect CR can be required to give up these advantages.
They may have to agree to resolve their disputes with the IRS through
binding arbitration conducted by specialized, independent government
arbitrators (perhaps organized into panels formed within the Treasury
Department but outside of the IRS). While taxpayers will have an oppor-
tunity to be represented by counsel, arbitration will be informal, and arbi-
trators' decisions will not be subject to appeal. A prototype for this bind-
ing arbitration system exists today, albeit in a much weaker form: the IRS
Office of Appeals.'
35
131. Taxpayers have a choice of litigating their disputes with the IRS in the Tax
Court, the district courts, or the Court of Federal Claims. Bittker & Lokken, supra note
127, 1 115.1. Only the Tax Court has specialistjudges with an expertise in adjudicating tax
controversies. For a recent example of a misguided opinion by a panel of prominent
appellate jurists, see Murphy v. IRS, 460 F.3d 79 (D.C. Cir. 2006), vacated, No. 05-5139,
2006 WL 4005276 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 22, 2006), opinion after reinstatement of appeal, 493
F.3d 170 (2007).
132. See, e.g., Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 2d 621, 623-24 (D.
Md. 2004), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 436 F.3d 431 (4th Cir. 2006). Commentators
referred to the district court decision as "preposterous." Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note
124, at 1964. The district court judge described the taxpayer's plan undertaken solely to
minimize taxes and involving a double-deduction of a single economic loss as "a thing of
grace and beauty." Karen C. Burke, Black & Decker's Contingent Liability Shelter: "A
Thing of Grace and Beauty?", 106 Tax Notes 577, 577 n.* (2005).
133. See, e.g., Sheryl Stratton, Government, Tax Bar Disagree over Impact of Coltec,
113 Tax Notes 523, 524 (2006) (reporting practitioner's belief that "[tlhe law is being
written on a slate that the government is selecting through docket management").
134. See, e.g., David M. Schizer, Enlisting the Tax Bar, 59 Tax L. Rev. 331, 335-36
(2006) ("[G]overnment litigators ... usually are more leanly staffed and less experienced
than taxpayer's counsel .... [The government] must settle most of its cases and, when it
litigates, it sometimes offers concessions it should not offer, and at times loses cases that it
should win.").
135. See, e.g., Tim Gray, IRS Office of Appeals: A Dispute Resolution Profile, 44 Tax
Notes 1466, 1466 (1989).
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Avoiders, and, to a lesser extent, evaders, will be reluctant to relin-
quish the benefits of current formal dispute resolution mechanisms. In
addition, if binding arbitration is combined with the pro-government sub-
stantive presumption, the cost of choosing CR for gainers of both types
will increase further. Today, interpretive canons and evidentiary rules al-
low litigants to shape the evidence on which the outcome of a trial is
based.1 3 6 Procedural rules occasionally prevent disputants from advanc-
ing winning arguments.' 3 7 Currently, these features favor taxpayers and
the government equally: Either the IRS or a taxpayer may benefit from a
procedural exclusion or an interpretive canon. This rough balance will
shift if the pro-government presumption is adopted in binding arbitra-
tion hearings. For instance, any evidence introduced by the government
will help its case. Only overwhelming evidence produced by a taxpayer
will give her a chance of overcoming the presumption. Thus, relaxing
evidentiary (and other) rules will give the government an additional ad-
vantage, further increasing the probability of conviction.
Binding arbitration will also increase the probability of paying a fine
(Ps) for evaders. Today, this probability is already high. Unlike avoid-
ance, evasion is nearly impossible to justify based on legal arguments.
1 38
Yet PF is not quite one hundred percent for two reasons. A tax evader
may convince a judge or jury that an underpayment of tax that has no
plausible legal justification was simply a mistake. The evader may also
escape penalty on a technicality, for instance if critical evidence favoring
the government is inadmissible or ifjudicial error requires the reversal of
a trial judge's decision against the taxpayer.' 39 The opportunity to ex-
ploit technicalities will be much reduced for those who accept binding
arbitration because the procedural rules of arbitration hearings will be
much less strict.140 There is also a reason to expect that government arbi-
trators will be better at distinguishing actual mistakes from flagrant cheat-
ing than generalist judges. Experience in making these determinations
will make it so. Today's generalists see relatively few tax evasion cases; CR
arbitrators will see plenty. These arbitrators will learn patterns of behav-
ior and gain insight into how people think of-and argue about-their
136. For instance, the parol evidence rule allows parties to exclude certain extrinsic
evidence. For a discussion of this rule in the tax context, see Alex Raskolnikov, The Cost of
Norms: Tax Effects of Tacit Understandings, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 601, 635-36 (2007).
137. See, e.g., Rothman v. Hosp. Serv. of S. Cal., 510 F.2d 956, 960 (9th Cir. 1975) ("It
is a well-established principle that in most instances an appellant may not present
arguments in the Court of Appeals that it did not properly raise in the court below.").
138. An evader may argue that he acted in good faith believing that he did nothing
wrong, see I.R.C. § 6664(c) (2006), but he may not raise substantive legal arguments
justifying a tax position that, by definition, has no legal justification.
139. See, e.g., United States v. Cohen, 510 F.3d 1114, 1125-27 (9th Cir. 2007)
(vacating trial court decision due to failure to admit testimony of tax protestor's
psychiatrist).
140. See, e.g.,Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is ItJust?, 57 Stan.




taxpaying decisions. Quite likely, evaders will have a hard time pleading
an innocent mistake in CR-a clear disincentive to choose this regime.
In sum, there are many reasons why binding arbitration, especially if
combined with a pro-government presumption, will impose significant
costs on avoiders and, to a lesser extent, evaders. Non-garners, in con-
trast, are unlikely to view binding arbitration as highly undesirable. They
will primarily want to make sure that they are protected from rogue, vin-
dictive, or simply incompetent IRS agents. A right to require a second
look by an independent arbitrator will satisfy this need. Losing other op-
portunities to defend one's tax position (such as the possible exclusion of
damaging evidence on technical grounds) will be of little concern for
most non-gamers. After all, their compliance decisions are not based on
these opportunities. 14 ' Thus, binding arbitration will be very costly for
gamers, giving them an incentive to choose DR. Non-garners will not be
affected nearly as much, making it more likely that they will elect CR to
avoid higher DR fines.
3. Limitations on Increasing the Probability of Conviction. - While the
two features just considered will assure some separation of gainers from
the rest, the extent of this separation is a more difficult question. The
probability of conviction (like any other probability) is upward-
bounded-it cannot exceed one hundred percent. Nominal fines, in
contrast, can be increased infinitely. Because of this disparity, when statu-
tory penalties in DR reach a certain critical level, even certainty of convic-
tion of detected tax avoidance in CR will not stop avoiders from choosing
that regime, defeating the separation objective. Moreover, even for nom-
inal fines below the critical level, it will be particularly difficult to prevent
the most aggressive avoiders from electing CR, as the following discussion
demonstrates.
If CR has both features discussed thus far, the probability of convic-
tion will become (roughly) 100%. What nominal fine imposed in DR
(foR) will induce a gamer to choose CR? Assume that audit rates (PA),
probability of detection (PD), and probability of fine (PF) are identical in
both regimes.' 42 Expected payment in DR (EPOR) is:
141. Empirical uncertainty makes this conclusion less definite with respect to non-
garners motivated primarily by feelings of guilt. In general, these taxpayers are probably
more concerned with penalties than with additional tax assessments. A penalty suggests
that the taxpayer's actions were inappropriate while an additional tax assessment merely
corrects a mistake. This reasoning, however, is speculative, making it difficult to evaluate
(1) whether guilt-driven taxpayers are likely to incur substantial costs by accepting the pro-
government presumption and binding arbitration, and (2) whether they are likely to be
more concerned with larger sanctions in DR or with a higher probability of having to pay
taxes due (with low or no penalties) in CR.
142. The assumption regarding a constant probability of detection PD is relaxed in the
next section. Variations in the probability of audit PA are addressed in Part IV.C. An
assumption that the probability of fine PF remains constant requires an explanation.
Theoretically, PF may be varied just like any other probability. In fact, it can be set at one
by switching to a strict liability regime. Yet, holding PF constant is not an unreasonable
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EPDR = PA x PD x PcDR x T x (1 + pF X f R)
where PcDR is the probability of conviction in DR. The expected pay-
ment in CR (EPcR) is:
EpCR P A x PDx 1.0 x Tx (1 + PFX fcR)
where 1.0 reflects the fact that the probability of conviction in CR is
100% (PccR = 1.0). The avoider will choose DR as long as EPDR is less than
EP', a condition that will hold if:
fDR< (1 + PFX fCR PCDR) + (pcDRx PF)143
Consider a numerical example. Assume that a tax avoider takes a
questionable position that is just as likely to be sustained as it is to be
rejected by a court. Probability of conviction in DR is 50% (PcDR = 0.5). A
position that has a fifty-fifty chance of success is unlikely to be penalized
(assume PF = 0.1). To make things more concrete, assume that nominal
CR fines are the same as they are today. Thus, if a penalty is imposed, it
will almost certainly equal 20% (fCR = 0.2) .144 The inequality then
becomes:
fDR < 10.4145
This is a fairly dramatic outcome. The current 20% penalty may be
increased fifty times (or 5000%), yet a gamer will still prefer DR to CR.
The intuition is that a very high DR penalty will be imposed only with a
very low probability (10%), and, moreover, the tax itself will be paid with
a moderate probability (50%, if the understatement is found). In con-
trast, once a tax understatement is detected in CR, it is certain to be paid.
The good news is that by increasing the probability of conviction in
CR, the government can give itself a lot of room to raise nominal fines in
DR while still effectively separating avoiders from the rest. There is bad
news, however, as well: Making conviction a virtual certainty in CR cre-
ates a marginal deterrence problem.
assumption. Expected penalty depends on the product of this probability and the nominal
fine (PF X f), and this product can be adjusted by changing either variable. Two reasons
suggest thatf (rather than PF) should be changed if a change in their product is desired in
DR. First, changes in statutory fines are more visible. Second, they are more concrete. If a
fine goes up from 20% to 40%, there is little doubt about the nature of the increase or its
precise magnitude. If a liability standard changes from a "gross disregard of rules and
regulations" to a "lack of due regard to rules and regulations," however, even a smart
gamer will need legal advice to decipher the meaning of the change. Moreover, it is surely
unclear whether this change raises PF by 50%, 100%, or some other amount. In CR, by
contrast, a change in Pr X f should be accomplished by an increase in PF (rather than J)
because it is less visible and is less likely to crowd out voluntary compliance. Thus, the
constant PF assumption is a simplification that may occasionally fail to hold.
143. The condition is PA x PD x PcDR x Tx (I+PF x P ) < PA x PD x 1.0 x Tx (1+PF x
JCR). Dividing both sides by PA x PD x T leads to PcDR + PcD x PF x fX < 1 + P, x f'; which
is equivalent to pDR X PF x DR < 1 + PF X fc - pDR; and the inequality in the text.
144. See I.R.C. § 6662(a) (2006) (imposing a 20% fine on accuracy-related
underpayments).
145. Jor < (1 + 0.1 x 0.2 - 0.5) + (0.5 x 0.1).
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Compare the somewhat cautious avoider just considered with a
highly aggressive avoider who takes a position that has an 80% chance of
being overruled in DR (PcDR = 0.8). Because there still is a colorable pro-
taxpayer argument, the nominal fine today (and in CR, by assumption) is
still 20% (fcR = 0.2). The likelihood that this fine will be imposed, how-
ever, is higher, reflecting the aggressiveness of the strategy (say 60%, or PF
= 0.6). Solving for fDR yields:
fDR < 0.67 146
The break-even nominal DR fine is dramatically lower for highly ag-
gressive positions than for moderately aggressive ones. The intuition is
that as positions become less defensible, the probability of conviction
(PcDR) and the probability of paying a fine (P) both approach 100% in
DR-as do the respective probabilities in CR. As this happens, the break-
even fine in DR (fVR) approaches the nominal CR penalty (fcR, which in
our example is 0.2, or 20%).
1 4 7
Two unhappy conclusions follow from this analysis. First, at any level
of nominal DR penalties, highly aggressive avoiders are more likely to
elect CR than moderately aggressive ones. Second, a dramatic increase in
statutory DR fines will make it worthwhile for the most aggressive avoiders
to elect CR, defeating the separation objective, at least as long as the pro-
government presumption and binding arbitration are the only measures
used to achieve the separation. The same is true for evaders. 1 48 Thus,
while these two measures will successfully separate moderately and mildly
aggressive avoiders from non-gainers even if statutory fines in DR are an
order of magnitude higher than in CR, other steps will be needed to deal
with the most blatant gainers in this case. Alternatively, nominal DR fines
that are significantly (two to three times) but not dramatically (forty to
fifty times) higher than in CR will induce aggressive avoiders as well as
moderate and cautious ones to elect DR, producing the desired separa-
tion, albeit with a lessened deterrent effect for gamers in DR.
C. Raising the Probability of Detection
Not all questionable positions are detected on audit. Gainers, no
doubt, are keenly aware of this fact. Raising the probability of detection
during an IRS examination is another way of deterring gamers from
choosing CR.
1. No Tax Preparer Privilege. - The attorney-client privilege is a fun-
damental feature of our dispute resolution system. The work product
privilege is important as well. Both protections may be invoked by the
146. jDR < (1 + 0.6 x 0.2 - 0.8) + (0.8 x 0.6). Note that the existence of risk-bearing
losses exacerbates the problem because higher DR penalties provide an additional
inducement for risk-averse garners to choose CR.
147. The inequality reduces tof R < (1 + i xf cR - 1) + (1 x 1), orfDR <fcR.
148. This statement ignores the additional cost borne by evaders (and very aggressive
avoiders) due to an increase in probability of fine resulting from the binding arbitration
feature which will, at the margin, impede some evaders from electing CR.
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accused against the government and private parties alike in a vast array of
controversies.1
49
The tax preparer privilege is different. It may be raised only against
the government 150 and in many more cases than either of the above pro-
tective rules.15 1 Moreover, this privilege applies in addition to (rather
than in lieu of) the attorney-client and the work product privileges.'
52
While the tax preparer privilege is less robust, 153 its existence, no doubt,
helps taxpayers to conceal certain aspects of their tax planning. In terms
of our model, this privilege reduces probability of detection.
Eliminating the tax preparer privilege will clearly be costly for
gamers, especially for sophisticated avoiders.' 54 Confidential discussions
with non-lawyer advisors, evaluations of the odds of prevailing on audit
and of possible outcomes of settlement negotiations, and explanations of
steps taken solely for tax avoidance purposes will all lose protection from
being revealed to the IRS. 155 Non-garners, by contrast, are unlikely to
care about elimination of this privilege. If a taxpayer instructs her ac-
countant to take conservative positions and "do the right thing," she will
have no reason to worry about concealing interactions with the preparer
from the government.'
5 6
149. See, e.g., Bruce Kayle, The Tax Adviser's Privilege in Transactional Matters: A
Synopsis and a Suggestion, 54 Tax Law. 509, 510-12 (2001) (providing brief overview of
both types of privilege).
150. See I.R.C. § 7525 (a) (2) (2006) (limiting application of privilege to tax matters
before IRS and federal proceedings by or against United States).
151. The privilege extends to "federally authorized tax practitioner[s]," a group that
includes certified public accountants, enrolled agents, and actuaries. § 7525(a)(1); Bittker
& Lokken, supra note 127, 112.2.1.
152. The privilege is defined as an extension of the attorney-client privilege to advice
given by federally authorized tax practitioners other than attorneys. § 7525(a)(1); Bittker
& Lokken, supra note 127, 112.2.1.
153. For instance, it does not apply to criminal matters and tax shelter promoters.
§ 7525(a) (2), (b).
154. Sophisticated avoiders discuss their tax planning with preparers. While the
wealthiest among them speak largely to lawyers (or to non-lawyers while lawyers are
involved, see infra note 155), other sophisticated avoiders discuss their taxes with non-
lawyers. Losing the preparer privilege will be particularly costly for that group.
Unsophisticated avoiders and evaders will be affected by a loss of the tax preparer privilege
much less. See infra text accompanying notes 188-189.
155. While the tax preparer privilege does not apply to tax shelters, it does apply to
confidential communications aimed at making sure (and, in fact, ensuring, at least in the
eyes of the client and her non-lawyer advisor) that a tax-motivated transaction is not a tax
shelter within the meaning of section 6662(d)(2)(C). It is also the case that some
discussions between taxpayers and non-lawyers are covered by the attorney-client privilege.
However, this happens only if a client has retained an attorney and a number of other
conditions are met. See United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 920-23 (2d Cir. 1961)
(exploring circumstances in which attorney-client privilege attaches to communications
between non-lawyers and a lawyer's client); Kayle, supra note 149, at 519-20 (discussing
Kovel). In the vast majority of tax preparation cases no attorney is involved.
156. An elimination of the tax preparer privilege in CR will neither contravene
longstanding legal principles nor conflict with a well-informed congressional decision.
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2. Narrow Separating Measures. - Some relatively narrow measures
may also prove to be effective in raising the probability of detection in
CR. Consider, for instance, the $50 billion-a-year problem of offshore
bank accounts. 157 Thousands of taxpayers lie on their returns, denying
ownership of these accounts. Detecting these lies on audit is all but im-
possible because the accounts are maintained at foreign banks located in
tax havens with strict privacy laws that prohibit financial institutions from
disclosing the identity of accountholders without their permission.
15 8
The government can force a taxpayer to consent to disclosure of this in-
formation, but only as part of a grand jury investigation. 15 9 Obviously,
the tax administrator's ability to obtain information in this manner is
limited.' 6 0
Non-gamers do not hide income offshore. They will have no reason
to resist if they are required, as part of entering CR, to authorize any
foreign bank located in any foreign jurisdiction to provide the IRS with
information about any account over which they have a right of withdrawal
(whether in person or as agents). Needless to say, gamers who do have
hidden offshore bank accounts will be extremely reluctant to agree to
this, as doing so will dramatically increase the odds that their evasion will
be detected. 1 6 1 Note also that while this condition sounds fairly complex,
The privilege was added to the Internal Revenue Code only in 1998. See Alyson Petroni,
Note, Unpacking the Accountant-Client Privilege Under I.R.C. Section 7525, 18 Va. Tax
Rev. 843, 844 (1999). It was enacted in the aftermath of congressional hearings that
demonized the IRS based on the unverified testimony of disguised IRS victims, some of
which later proved to be false. See Lee A. Sheppard, Penalty Scheme Up for Reappraisal,
119 Tax Notes 669, 670 (2008). And it was advocated primarily by accountants seeking a
stronger position in their then-unfolding competition with law firms for tax advice services
(including highly profitable tax shelter business). See Randolph J. Buchanan, Corporate
Tax Shelter Exception to the Accountant-Client Privilege, 96 Tax Notes 1619, 1622 (2002).
157. The $50 billion-a-year number is a middle-of-the-road estimate. See Robert
Goulder, Senators Criticize Treasury's Complacency on Offshore Evasion, 115 Tax Notes
521, 521 (2007) (quoting Prof. Avi-Yonah's $50 billion estimate, referring to competing
estimates ranging from $40 to $70 billion).
158. See, e.g., Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 203-04 (1988) (describing such
accounts, and noting that Cayman Islands law, for example, makes unauthorized disclosure
of confidential information a criminal offense).
159. See id. at 219 (holding that such compelled disclosure does not violate Fifth
Amendment).
160. An IRS settlement offer to holders of offshore bank accounts-under which
holders were required to divulge information and pay back taxes in exchange for reduced
penalties-had little success. See Martin A. Sullivan, Keeping Score on Offshore: U.K.
60,000, U.S. 1,300, 116 Tax Notes 23, 26-27 (2007) (describing initiative and reporting
disappointing results).
161. The odds will remain below 100% because when the IRS audits a taxpayer with
an undisclosed offshore bank account, it will not know which foreign banks it should ask
about the existence of this taxpayer's accounts. Furthermore, offshore evaders may try to
get around the new disclosure rule by holding offshore accounts through designees (who,
presumably, will be foreigners not subject to the same disclosure requirement themselves).
This response will be costly, however, because offshore evaders will have to assume the risk
that their designees will run away with the money. For a detailed analysis of "relational tax
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it may be expressed in very straightforward terms. Taxpayers electing CR
can simply be required to permit the IRS to acquire as much information
about them from foreign banks as the Agency can currently receive from
financial institutions located within the United States.
Disclosure of so-called tax accrual workpapers is another measure
that will result in a limited increase in the probability of detection affect-
ing some gamers. Accrual workpapers are records containing a tax-
payer's (or, more likely, tax advisor's) notes and calculations related to
tax return preparation. These records may include the evaluation of
strengths and weaknesses of a given tax position, estimates of the likeli-
hood of losing in a dispute over the position with the IRS, and the ex-
pected settlement value of the position.1 62 While many wealthy individu-
als and businesses possess tax accrual workpapers, public companies are
now required to maintain a special set of these documents that is particu-
larly useful to the IRS. These special workpapers underlie each com-
pany's public disclosures pursuant to the recently adopted FIN 48.163
This accounting standard requires companies to create reserves for un-
certain tax positions and sets forth the rules for determining the amount
of those reserves.1 64 Workpapers supporting FIN 48 disclosures are espe-
cially valuable to the IRS because they are more likely than ordinary
workpapers to lead an auditor to questionable tax planning.
Currently, the IRS follows a "policy of restraint," requesting
workpapers only in a narrow set of circumstances.1 65 Many taxpayers be-
lieve that the IRS has no power to compel production of these papers in
any case. 166 Another CR condition, then, can be a requirement that tax-
payers reveal FIN 48 workpapers (or all workpapers) to the IRS without
asserting any privileges (except for situations where disclosure may give
rise to criminal liability). Needless to say, tax avoiders will loathe the
prospect of giving the IRS a roadmap of their avoidance. Non-gamers, in
planning" of a type just described, see Alex Raskolnikov, Relational Tax Planning Under
Risk-Based Rules, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1181, 1197-1201 (2008).
162. While there is no universally accepted definition of tax accrual workpapers, for a
recent description, see United States v. Textron Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 138, 142-43 (D.R.I.
2007), aff'd in part, vacated in part, No. 07-2631, 2009 IL 136752 (1st Cir. Jan. 21, 2009),
reh'g en banc granted, No. 07-2631, 2009 WL 775439 (1st Cir. Mar. 25, 2009).
163. See Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., Interpretation Number 48: Accounting for
Uncertainty in Income Taxes 20-21 (2008), available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/
aopFIN48.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (detailing disclosure requirements).
For a description of FIN 48, see, e.g., Joann Weiner, Uncertainty All Around: FIN 48 at
NTA's Spring Symposium, 115 Tax Notes 1001, 1001-03 (2007).
164. See Financial Accounting Status Board, supra note 163, 1-24.
165. See Weiner, supra note 163, at 1003.
166. It is not entirely clear which side has a better argument, and taxpayers appear to
have the upper hand at the moment. See Textron, 2009 WL 136752, at *15 (holding that
tax accrual workpapers are protected by work product privilege); Regions Fin. Corp. v.




contrast, will welcome (or at least not mind) a resolution of genuinely
uncertain issues.
Yet another example of a narrow separating measure involves sub-
jecting potentially aggressive tax planning to the public eye rather than
just the IRS's gaze. Peter Canellos and Edward Kleinbard have long advo-
cated for disclosure of the so-called Schedule M-a tax worksheet pre-
pared by public companies to reconcile their tax and financial account-
ing figures. 167 Requiring companies that elect CR to disclose their
Schedules M to the public will increase the likelihood that questionable
tax schemes will be detected by third party observers such as academics
and whistleblowers. Again, corporations that have no appetite for aggres-
sive tax structures will accept this measure much more readily than com-
panies that view taxes as just another cost of doing business, to be mini-
mized as much as possible.'
68
It is worth noting that Canellos and Kleinbard have urged making
Schedules M publicly available for all public companies; the IRS believes
that it already has the power to demand production of tax accrual
workpapers; and there is no good reason why taxpayers should be able to
hide assets offshore regardless of whether or not the dual enforcement
regime is adopted. All these narrow separating strategies are worth im-
plementing (or reaffirming) even in the current system. Similarly, there is
little doubt that existing audit levels are unacceptably low. When the
probability of an IRS examination is less than one percent, neither the
existing regime nor any realistic alternative can produce a significant im-
provement in tax collections. More speculatively, such measures as a pro-
government presumption and binding tax arbitration may be worth
adopting in some form not just as optional CR features, but across the
board. Nonetheless, this Article's goal is not to add to the chorus of
voices calling for a substantial increase in audit rates, or to argue for a
complete overhaul of our dispute resolution system. Therefore, this
Part's discussion is focused on evaluating whether certain policy instru-
ments may be used as separating features in the dual enforcement re-
gime, rather than evaluating whether any of these instruments should be
applied across the board.
167. See Peter C. Canellos & Edward D. Kleinbard, Disclosing Book-Tax Differences,
96 Tax Notes 999, 999-1000 (2002).
168. Compare, for instance, the following statements by two high-ranking corporate
tax officials: "I want to know what the right answer is. I don't want to have tax reserves. I
want to file my tax return correctly." Nanci Palmintere, Vice President and Dir., Global
Tax and Trade, Intel Corp., Session 10: Risk of Controversy with the Tax Authorities,
Panel Before the Tax Council Policy Institute's Eighth Annual Tax Policy & Practice
Symposium (Feb. 2007), in Taxes, June 2007, at 137, 163. "[T]he tax department does
look to exploit opportunities to reduce tax. It's not merely a compliance shop but also
looks to minimize the company's worldwide tax liability." Rick D'Avino, Vice-President
and Senior Tax Counsel, GE Capital and NBC Universal, Session 5: Developing a Global
Corporate Tax Risk Strategy, Panel Before the Tax Council Policy Institute's Eighth
Annual Tax Policy & Practice Symposium (Feb. 2007), in Taxes, June 2007, at 83, 88.
[Vol. 109:689
REVEALING CHOICES
D. Limiting Opportunities to Take Aggressive Positions
The opportunity to take aggressive positions is not directly reflected
in the expected payment calculus, but it is critical to overall deterrence.
It is no accident that for income subject to information reporting and
withholding at the source, the level of compliance approximates one
hundred percent.1 69 Gainers lacking the opportunity to game the system
pay their taxes. Yet an attempt by Congress to expand withholding to
new types of income proved to be so unpopular that the relevant legisla-
tion was repealed before going into effect.17 0 While gamers clearly had
an incentive to stop the expansion, the impact it would have had on non-
garners is not entirely clear. It is uncertain whether these taxpayers view
withholding as evidence of government distrust or as a "good housekeep-
ing" policy that simplifies the payment of their taxes. Further empirical
research is needed on this issue. In the meantime, this subsection focuses
on other measures that might limit the opportunity to take aggressive tax
positions, measures that are both unlikely to burden non-gamers and cer-
tain to create additional obstacles for garners thinking about choosing
CR.
1. Higher Standards for Tax Preparers. - Regulation of tax return
preparers is an important element of modern tax enforcement. Con-
straining the kind of advice they may provide limits tax planning opportu-
nities for seventy-eight million taxpayers who use return preparation ser-
vices.1 7 1 Today, preparers are governed by their own set of rules.
172
Congress recently experimented with making these rules more stringent
than those applying to taxpayers, but it ultimately retreated to the histori-
cal status quo of equivalent compliance benchmarks for taxpayers and
preparers.1 73 While I agree that in the current system this equivalence is
appropriate, 7 4 a set of preparer standards that is substantially more de-
169. See, e.g., Slemrod, Small Business, supra note 2, at 84.
170. See Bittker & Lokken, supra note 127, 111.5.3; John T. Scholz, Compliance
Research and the Political Context of Tax Administration, in 2 Taxpayer Compliance:
Social Sciences Perspectives, supra note 51, at 12, 16.
171. The figure is from 2006. See U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-08-38, 2007
Filing Season Continues Trend of Improvement, but Opportunities to Reduce Costs and
Increase Tax Compliance Should Be Evaluated 17 (2007), available at http://www.gao.
gov/new.items/d0838.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter GAO
Report].
172. See I.R.C. § 6694 (2006) (specifying penalties for tax return preparers); Treas.
Dep't Circular 230, 31 C.F.R. pt. 10 (2008) (setting forth standards of practice before IRS).
173. See Jeremiah Coder, Change in Penalty Standard Will Not Require Total Rewrite
of Regs, 121 Tax Notes 132, 132 (2008).
174. This does not mean, however, that I agree with the congressional solution to the
disparity between the rules applying to taxpayers and preparers. Rather than equalizing
down, Congress should have equalized up by strengthening the standard applying to
taxpayers. For a thoughtful argument that the current taxpayer compliance standards are




manding than the current one can be a useful feature of the compliance
regime.
To appreciate how more stringent preparer standards can facilitate
the separation of gainers from non-gainers, consider the current rules
first. Very generally, a taxpayer is not subject to penalties as long as he
takes a position that is supported by "substantial authority," that is, has a
33% to 40% chance of being upheld if challenged. 175 If a taxpayer dis-
closes a position to the IRS, he has to meet only a lower "reasonable ba-
sis" standard to avoid fines.176 Either way, a taxpayer may take a position
that has less than a fifty-fifty chance of being correct, yet not be subject to
penalties. While preparer penalties currently contain the same thresh-
olds, and while this parity should be maintained in DR, preparers assist-
ing taxpayers who choose CR can be made subject to a more demanding
standard. Specifically, they may be fined for advising with respect to any
substantial position unless it should (has at least a 60-80% chance of be-
ing sustained) or even will (has at least a 90-95% chance of being sus-
tained) be upheld if challenged.1 77 The elective nature of CR makes all
the difference in the analysis.
It is true that subjecting preparers to higher standards will create a
potential conflict of interest: Taxpayers electing CR will be entitled to
take aggressive positions without exposing themselves to fines, yet their
advisors will risk penalties for counseling about these positions. However,
if a CR taxpayer asking about an aggressive position is a non-gamer, she
will have no desire to push the limits of the law. In this case there will be
no taxpayer interest with which the preparer's penalty-induced conserva-
tism will conflict. If, on the other hand, a taxpayer is a gamer who elects
CR to escape higher statutory fines in DR, we will want the preparer to
impede this taxpayer's aggressive planning. The resulting conflict of in-
terest will be desirable because its anticipation will prevent some gainers
from electing CR.
Another potential problem with high preparer standards is that the
tax treatment of some business-motivated transactions may be so uncer-
tain that these transactions cannot be reflected on a return in a way that
should or will be upheld if challenged. The tax consequences of these
deals are simply unclear. Forcing taxpayers contemplating these transac-
tions either to forgo them or to be forced into DR would be inefficient.
The solution to this dilemma is three-pronged. First, the preparer can be
175. The "substantial authority" rule (but not its numerical translation) may be found
in section 6662(d) (2) (B) (i).
176. See § 6662(d) (2) (B) (ii). It is generally believed that positions that have a
20-25% chance of success if challenged satisfy this standard.
177. Because tax advice can take place long before a taxpayer actually files a return
and elects an enforcement regime, and because the advisor may not be the person who
ultimately prepares the taxpayer's return, the taxpayer will need to give written assurance
to the advisor regarding which regime the taxpayer will ultimately choose. If the taxpayer
violates this promise, the preparer penalty may either cease to apply, or it may remain in
place, giving the advisor a cause of action against the taxpayer.
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permitted to advise a CR taxpayer with respect to transactions with uncer-
tain tax treatment without fear of penalties as long as the tax position
adopted on the return produces the smallest tax savings of those availa-
ble.178 Alternatively, the taxpayer may be permitted to take the position
with the highest likelihood of being correct (even if it favors the tax-
payer), 179 but both the taxpayer and the advisor should then be required
to provide the IRS with a concise disclosure of the transaction, the
amount of tax liability in question, and the tax analysis of the critical
issue(s) (including the reason for uncertainty and the alternative tax
treatments).1 80 Among other things, this disclosure will help the IRS in
spotting advisors who happen to assist taxpayers with highly uncertain
transactions time after time. This information will be valuable in evaluat-
ing both the advisor and the advisor's clients. 18 1 A third alternative to
resolving highly uncertain tax questions in CR will be to request prefiling
advice from the IRS, advice that should be readily available in that re-
gime, as discussed below.
182
2. Higher Penalties for Tax Preparers. - Tax preparers are subject to
penalties today, and they will face sanctions in both regimes under con-
sideration. There is no reason, however, that preparer penalties should
be the same in CR and DR. In contrast with statutory fines applicable to
taxpayers, preparer sanctions should be higher in CR.
Three considerations make the analysis of preparer and taxpayer
penalties different. First, there are many fewer preparers than taxpayers.
Therefore, even if the per-individual risk-bearing loss produced by high
fines is the same for preparers and taxpayers, the aggregate social cost of
high preparer sanctions in CR is likely to be much smaller. 183 Second,
178. For an example, see supra note 130.
179. That is, a taxpayer may take position A from the example in note 130, supra-a
position with only a forty percent chance of success, but with the higher likelihood of
being correct than positions B or C favoring the government.
180. These conditions should limit overdisclosure-a serious problem with the
current disclosure rules. See Joshua D. Blank, Overcoming Overdisclosure: Toward Tax
Shelter Detection, 56 UCLA L. Rev. (forthcoming Aug. 2009), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1285342 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (investigating sources of
and solutions to overdisclosure in tax shelter reporting).
181. The idea that aggressive advisors are a valuable source of information about their
aggressive clients is reflected in the current rules aimed at tax shelters. See § 6112
(requiring material advisors to keep lists of their tax shelter clients and make these lists
available to IRS for inspection on request).
182. See infra Part III.E.3.
183. This is true as long as the same total social gain results from making taxpayers on
the one hand and preparers on the other equally compliant. In fact, the conclusion is
even stronger because the total gain from deterring preparers is larger. A single preparer
made more conservative by higher fines inhibits the aggressive tax planning of many
taxpayers who use his services. Thus, compared to larger taxpayer sanctions, higher
preparer penalties produce a larger social gain per unit of deadweight loss. On the other
hand, if a preparer serves 100 clients, and each return has only a slight chance of
triggering a preparer penalty, the cumulative probability of incurring a penalty may be
significant. It is not entirely clear how to compare the resulting higher risk-bearing loss of
2009]
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considerable evidence suggests that preparers are often gamers.184 High
fines deter gamers well. Finally, preparers are agents, not principals. If a
principal is a reciprocator who detests tax shelters, it is less important
whether the preparer's aspiration is to file a return showing the lowest
possible tax liability or one that will go through an audit unchallenged.
Thus, even if high penalties turn some non-gamer preparers into gamers
through crowding out or a similar mechanism, the negative effect on tax
compliance will not be as significant as when this metamorphosis hap-
pens to taxpayers themselves.
18 5
Preparer-focused measures will be effective even if preparers initially
decide to respond to the suggested CR features not by giving more con-
servative advice in that regime, but by varying prices for their advice
based on its aggressiveness. In short, price discrimination should not
work in CR. Preparers who decide to provide aggressive advice in CR will
have to charge more to compensate for exposing themselves to larger
expected sanctions. 18 6 Conceivably, the same preparer may prepare both
conservative and aggressive CR returns. Most preparers, however, will
specialize.
Specialization will help preparers to establish a reputation-a useful
marketing tool. In addition, providing aggressive return preparation re-
quires expertise that is costly to develop and maintain. A preparer who
becomes an expert in aggressive return preparation will waste her skills by
working on conservative returns. To prevent preparers from establishing
a broad client base by giving aggressive advice both in DR and CR, the
government may require preparers to commit to a single regime. 18 7 As a
the preparer to the 100 smaller risk-bearing losses that are incurred by individual taxpayers
if they are exposed to higher penalties themselves.
184. Compared to self-prepared returns, professionally prepared ones are less likely
to contain obvious mistakes (or indefensible positions) and more likely to reflect plausible
but aggressive positions. Preparers, in other words, induce (or at least assist) taxpayers in
gaming the system. See, e.g., Steven Klepper et al., Expert Intermediaries and Legal
Compliance: The Case of Tax Preparers, 34J.L. & Econ. 205, 226 (1991) (suggesting that
preparers induce noncompliance with ambiguous rules while facilitating compliance with
clear ones); see also Andreoni et al., supra note 4, at 847 (pointing out that Klepper et al.
explanation ignores possible selection effect, but also discussing study by Erard that found
use of lawyer or CPA to be "significantly associated with increased noncompliance, even
after controlling for self-selection"). It is likely that one has to be a gamer oneself to
encourage others to engage in gaming.
185. Steps should be taken to assure that preparers follow their clients' wishes
regarding the aggressiveness of return positions rather than their own. See infra text
accompanying note 241.
186. I assume that preparers are truthful with their clients, have no intrinsic
preference for preparing particularly aggressive returns, and there is price competition in
the return preparation industry.
187. That is, each preparer will have to declare to the IRS that he will assist in
preparing returns only subject to DR or CR. If the IRS identifies a preparer who
repeatedly gives aggressive advice after having elected CR, the government may ban this
preparer from participating in that regime in future years.
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result, some CR preparers will decide to be aggressive and charge more,
while others will assist only with conservative returns and charge less.
Once taxpayers engage in comparison shopping, aggressive
preparers will have to explain the reason for their higher fees. Non-
gamers will not use expensive CR preparers because these taxpayers will
be unwilling to pay a premium for taking aggressive positions. Gainers
who elect CR, in contrast, will all prefer more aggressive, higher-cost
preparers. This will give the IRS a clear opportunity to identify disguised
gamers and to penalize aggressive preparers. As soon as an audit discov-
ers a gamer in CR, the IRS can examine other clients of that gamer's
preparer. If the government announces this approach (as it should), ag-
gressive advice in CR will become extremely costly for preparers and tax-
payers alike.
In sum, whether or not the substantive standards applying to
preparers are higher in CR than in DR, violation of these standards can
be penalized more severely when the return being prepared is for a CR
taxpayer. Higher sanctions will make preparers more cautious in advising
taxpayers who contemplate taking questionable positions. Gainers who
choose CR will have a hard time finding advisors willing to assist them in
their games. Non-gamers, on the other hand, will care little if preparers
become more conservative. These taxpayers have no interest in ob-
taining aggressive advice, so foregoing an opportunity to receive it will be
no loss to them. Thus, higher preparer penalties in CR will be more
costly for garners than for other taxpayers-a feature that will facilitate
the desired separation between garners and the rest.
Unfortunately, measures affecting return preparers are unlikely to
have a significant impact on evaders and unsophisticated avoiders. Some
evaders do not file returns at all. Unsophisticated avoiders calculate their
taxes themselves. In both scenarios, no preparer is ever involved. 188
Other evaders lie to their preparers, for instance, by not telling them
about cash receipts or by denying ownership of offshore bank accounts.
It is possible that in some cases a preparer is an accomplice in filing a
fraudulent return. Yet the empirical data suggests that preparers tend to
stay away from clearly indefensible positions. 18 9 Evaders, no doubt, take
this tendency into account. Thus, other measures will be needed to pre-
vent evaders and unsophisticated avoiders from choosing CR.
E. Rewarding Non-Gamers
Imposing different costs on gamers and non-gamers is not the sole
means of separating the two groups. An obvious alternative is to vary ben-
188. However, either an evader or an unsophisticated avoider may retain a non-lawyer
representative (such as a CPA or enlisted agent) during an audit.
189. See Klepper et al., supra note 184, at 210 n.27 (citing a Westat survey finding that




efits. This can be done in one of two ways. First, CR may provide benefits
whose value is higher to non-gamers than to gamers. Second, CR may
provide benefits equally valuable to all taxpayers in such a way that makes
them much more likely to be received by non-gamers. This section con-
siders benefits of each kind.
1. Reimbursement of Costs for Prevailing Taxpayers. - Some of the costs
borne by taxpayers as the result of a tax audit are intangible: anxiety,
disillusionment with the government officials, and the like. Many costs,
however, are financial: payments to advisors, forgone income, and so on.
Similar costs are incurred by taxpayers who decide to pursue binding ar-
bitration or litigation. It makes sense to reimburse CR taxpayers for all
these financial costs, but only if they are audited, a deficiency is assessed
against them, they decide to contest that deficiency, and they prevail.
The idea of reimbursing taxpayers for audit costs is not new. Yet the
typical argument is that taxpayers should be made whole whenever the
IRS examiners conclude that the return is essentially correct. 190 In con-
trast, the reimbursement proposed here will take place only if the IRS
contests the reported tax liability but later loses in arbitration or litiga-
tion. Economic analysis of litigation expenses is well developed. 19 1 How-
ever, it does not address nonrational taxpayers such as many non-gamers.
Thus, while a reimbursement of litigation and audit costs is hardly a revo-
lutionary concept, the specific proposal made here has not been studied
thus far.
Reimbursement will be effective in benefiting non-gamers more than
gamers as long as the probability of conviction in CR is high (for in-
stance, because one or both possible CR features discussed in Part III.C
are adopted). Consider a tax avoider who contemplates choosing CR. If
his aggressive position is detected on audit, arbitration (or litigation)
makes little sense when CR features some form of pro-government pre-
sumption. Because this gamer has no chance of success in arbitration,
the likelihood of receiving a reimbursement (that is, its expected value) is
extremely low. A non-gamer, by contrast, will contest an auditor's deter-
mination only if she believes that the auditor is mistaken. Sometimes this
belief will be unjustified, but on other occasions it will be correct, and the
non-gamer will end up being reimbursed for her costs. Overall, the pro-
posed reimbursement will be viewed as meaningless by garners and will
have a clear positive value to non-garners, at least to the rational ones.
The reimbursement will also have a symbolic value: The government
has made a mistake, wasting the taxpayer's time, energy, and resources,
and it compensates the taxpayer for this imposition. Again, this intangi-
190. See Bankman, Eight Truths, supra note 61, at 515 (suggesting "intent here would
be to reassure the average voter that she need not worry about misuse of audit power").
191. For a summary of the basic conclusions, see, for example, Steven Shavell, The
Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal




ble aspect of the proposed reimbursement will have a different effect on
gamers and many non-garners. Reasons do not matter to rational actors
(gamers and non-garners alike). They will always prefer a $150 payment
to a $100 payment combined with an apology. But many nonrational in-
dividuals care about reasons.1 9 2 These taxpayers will appreciate the mere
fact of an apologetic act by the government. A brief letter from the IRS
acknowledging a mistake and stressing the compensatory nature of reim-
bursement will help frame the payment as an act of reconciliation, boost-
ing a taxpayer's morale and assuring continuing compliance.
1 9 3
2. Different Audit Strategies and Separate Enforcement Staffs. - Much has
been written about the benefits of "responsive regulation."1 9 4 The key
idea is that a regulator has nothing to gain and a lot to lose by starting its
relationship with a regulatee in an adversarial manner. Hostile, disre-
spectful treatment by the government undermines (or eliminates) the
private party's predisposition to comply voluntarily, forcing the regulatee
to dig in his heels. Because cooperative, problem-solving enforcement is
always cheaper than contentious negotiations and eventual litigation-
for private parties and government agencies alike-responsive regulation
proponents argue that each regulator-regulatee relationship should start
in a respectful, cooperative manner. If a particular regulatee does not
respond to this approach, the regulator should gradually switch to in-
creasingly adversarial enforcement. The metaphor of an iron fist in a
velvet glove aptly describes this strategy.
1 9 5
While several scholars have argued that responsive regulation should
work well in tax enforcement, it is difficult to see how this can be so as
192. See, e.g., Kahan, Trust, supra note 5, at 344 ("As the trust and reciprocity
literature shows, individuals don't just respond to financial incentives; they interpret them as
signs of others' attitudes and intentions.").
193. Compare Feld & Frey, supra note 10, at 109-10 (urging rewards for "good"
taxpayers in form of monetary payments or in-kind benefits such as public transportation
discounts and free access to museums, without explaining, however, how tax authority can
identify "good" taxpayers), with Michael Wenzel, A Letter from the Tax Office:
Compliance Effects of Informational and Interpersonal Justice, 19 Soc. Just. Res. 345,
348-54 (2006) (summarizing arguments that apologies and expressions of regret from
government officials promote interpersonal justice, perceptions of fairness, and, therefore,
compliance, and adding further support for these propositions with an original
experiment).
194. The foundational work is Ian Ayres &John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation:
Transcending the Deregulation Debate (1992) [hereinafter, Ayres & Braithwaite,
Responsive Regulation]. For a review of how this concept has been applied to tax
enforcement, see Valerie Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation and Taxation: Introduction,
29 Law & Pol'y 3 (2007) [hereinafter Braithwaite, Responsive Taxation].
195. Another oft-used metaphor is "speak softly while carrying a big stick." See Ayres
& Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation, supra note 194, at 19. More technically, the
literature has developed the concept of an "enforcement pyramid," with persuasive
approaches forming the base of regulatory action, and increasingly coercive measures
applied as lower-tier measures fail. See id. at 35-36, 38-40 (presenting enforcement
pyramid concept); Braithwaite, Responsive Taxation, supra note 194, at 4-5 (applying
enforcement pyramid concept to tax administration).
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long as tax administration continues with a one-size-fits-all model. The
success of responsive regulation depends critically on a regulator being
able to decide whether a regulatee is willing to comply voluntarily, or
needs a gentle nudge, the threat of substantial sanctions, or perhaps even
criminal prosecution in order to cooperate or comply. To make this de-
termination, the regulator must engage with each regulatee on a continu-
ous basis. 19 6 With tens of millions of regulatee-taxpayers, this is simply
impossible.
Introducing a dual enforcement regime changes the analysis. The
choice between DR and CR can be thought of as an effort by the IRS to
contact each taxpayer and inquire whether he (she, or it) would like to
cooperate. If so, CR welcomes each of them. If not, DR offers familiar
adversarial audits. Of course, unlike in an extended one-on-one regula-
tory engagement, where a regulator can easily detect adversarial tactics
that follow a regulatee's (false) commitment to cooperation, the election
between DR and CR may be gamed. Yet the promise of cooperative, con-
sumer-friendly audits in CR will have a separating effect nonetheless.
Gainers do not care about niceness. They prefer mean but incompetent
auditors who cannot find any of their tax shelters to respectful but sharp
examiners who eventually unearth all of their aggressive schemes. But for
many non-gainers, respectful treatment and a cooperative attitude from
government regulators have independent value. A promise of respectful,
problem-solving audits will provide significant inducement for these indi-
viduals to elect CR, without giving gainers a strong reason to do the same.
Perhaps respectful auditors are less likely to detect noncompliance.
If so, gainers will prefer cooperative CR auditors to adversarial DR exam-
iners. Even in this case, however, nonrational non-gamers will derive an
additional intangible benefit from cooperative examinations. Moreover,
a respectful audit need not be an ineffective one, as the responsive regu-
lation literature has aptly demonstrated.1 9 7 A velvet glove will cover an
iron fist only as long as the taxpayer cooperates. A shift to adversarial
enforcement will always be available in CR, ensuring that respectful au-
dits remain effective in the face of uncooperative taxpayers (who are
196. It is no accident that Ayres and Braithwaite's work builds the responsive
regulation idea upon insights from the repeat prisoner's dilemma game. See Ayres &
Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation, supra note 194, at 20-27. For the same reason, until a
recent attempt to apply the responsive regulation approach to the entire Australian, New
Zealand, and East Timor tax systems, it had been applied only to "small regulatory
communities where encounters with inspectors occur face-to-face, as in regulation of the
environment, nursing homes, and occupational health and safety standards." Jenny Job et
al., Culture Change in Three Taxation Administrations: From Command-and-Control to
Responsive Regulation, 29 Law & Pol'y 84, 85 (2007).
197. See John Braithwaite, Meta Risk Management and Responsive Regulation for
Tax System Integrity, 25 Law & Pol'y 1, 3-11 (2003) (discussing increasingly adversarial
regulatory options in dealing with tax preparation software developers and companies
engaged in transfer pricing); Braithwaite, Responsive Taxation, supra note 194, at 4-5
(discussing enforcement pyramid with escalating sanctions).
[Vol. 109:689
REVEALING CHOICES
likely to be gamers hiding in that regime). For all these reasons, the
promise of cooperative, perhaps even sympathetic, audits can be another
feature distinguishing CR from DR.
Several years ago, Australian revenue authorities decided to adopt a
responsive regulation approach to tax enforcement. 198 Auditors were in-
structed to abandon their typical, confrontational posture and to empha-
size cooperation and joint problem solving, at least until it became clear
that this "soft" approach did not work with a particular taxpayer. One of
many interesting findings from this countrywide experiment is that the
reform confused Australian tax examiners. They had developed their in-
vestigatory skills and attitudes toward taxpayers in a highly adversarial,
anti-taxpayer enforcement agency. These auditors knew how to be for-
malistic and tough; they had no idea how to be flexible and
cooperative. ' 99
The Australian experience suggests that it may be difficult for IRS
auditors to adjust their attitudes when interacting with taxpayers subject
to both regimes. Therefore, DR and CR should have separate audit
staffs.200 In addition to making it easier for the IRS examiners to develop
audit techniques and cultures appropriate for each regime, creating sepa-
rate audit staffs will signal the seriousness of the government's commit-
ment to voluntary compliance in CR.
3. Prefiling Assistance with Resolving Questionable Positions. - The last
thing garners want is to tip off the IRS about their questionable posi-
tions.20 1 The chance to win the audit lottery is a major factor in calculat-
ing expected penalties. Making aggressive transactions unnecessarily
complex is a well-known trick used to hide them during an audit. Be-
198. See Vivienne Waller, The Challenge of Institutional Integrity in Responsive
Regulation: Field Inspections by the Australian Taxation Office, 29 Law & Pol'y 67, 68-69
(2007) (describing model as adopted in Australia).
199. See id. at 76, 81 (pointing out that Australian Tax Office's commitment to
formalistic procedures was "in tension with the flexible approach of responsive regulation"
and that "field officers seemed uncomfortable with admitting how they tried to detect non-
compliance, but emphasized building relationships"). For a broader discussion of
challenges involved in switching from adversarial to cooperative tax enforcement, see Job
et al., supra note 196, at 92-97.
200. Even in this case CR auditors will need to learn when and how to switch to more
adversarial negotiations once they detect taxpayer resistance. To the extent the Australian
experience suggests that this switch may be difficult to achieve, the problem will remain
even in a dual regime with separate enforcement staffs. However, many CR audits are
likely to result in no adjustments, and a portion of those that do will remain cooperative.
Therefore, a large portion of CR auditors will rarely need to switch to an adversarial
posture. They will fully benefit from developing specialized cooperative examination skills
without simultaneously maintaining adversarial ones. In addition, it may be easier for a
cooperative auditor to become more adversarial in the face of a taxpayer's refusal to
cooperate than it is to do the same simply because a taxpayer happened to elect one
regime or another.
201. Revealing dubious schemes to the IRS amounts to setting both the probability of
audit and the probability of detection to one.
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cause the government will reject aggressive interpretations more often
than not, gamers will not disclose these interpretations voluntarily.
Non-gainers have a different view. They do not engage in aggressive
schemes on purpose. But given the tax law's complexity, non-gainers oc-
casionally stumble into questions that have no clear answers. They would
be happy to get the government's view of what the right answer is and
move on. In fact, many non-gainers today are frustrated by their inability
to have their questions answered by an IRS representative.2 02 Some may
view this as a breach of an implicit contract obligating taxpayers to
responsibly calculate and pay their taxes and the government to provide
taxpayers with timely and useful assistance.20 3
The IRS has already started what might be considered a pilot project
for creating a dual enforcement system involving prefiling advice. For
several years, it has run the so-called Compliance Assurance Program for
some of the largest corporate taxpayers. The idea is that a company
should present all of its uncertain tax issues to the IRS before it files its
return. The parties can then quickly identify areas of agreement, work
together to resolve differences, and set aside issues where no agreement
can be reached. Only the last category of questions is examined on audit.
Needless to say, only companies that "want to file [their] tax return[s]
correctly" rather than to minimize their taxes at all costs participate in
the program.
20 4
These observations suggest that another CR feature worth consider-
ing is much more robust prefiling assistance from the IRS (compared
both to what exists today and what will continue to exist in DR). Imple-
menting this measure will involve a significant investment in hiring and
training the IRS agents needed to answer numerous taxpayer inquiries.
Yet this investment may be well worth making because improved taxpayer
assistance is likely not only to facilitate the separation of gainers from the
rest, but to increase compliance among non-gainers as well.
Needless to say, many design details of this proposal will need to be
addressed. For instance, it will be important to decide to what extent the
improved CR prefiling advice will bind the IRS. 20 5 Several solutions ap-
pear reasonable. For instance, if CR includes a pro-government pre-
202. For instance, an IRS taskforce recently "discovered problems with the way in
which formal and informal advice was being rendered by legal counsel. Overall, the task
force criticized the process by finding that the timeliness, quality, and efficiency of the
legal advice was insufficient and needed improvement." David L. Click & Jennifer B.
Green, New IRS Legal Advice Vehicles: Still Room for Improvement, 112 Tax Notes 985,
988 (2006) (citation omitted).
203. See Feld & Frey, supra note 10, at 103-04 (explaining taxpayer's duty to pay as "a
complicated interaction between taxpayers and the government establishing a fair,
reciprocal exchange that involves the giving and taking of both parties").
204. See Palmintere, supra note 168, at 163. The Advance Pricing Agreement
program and the Private Letter Ruling program have similar features.
205. Currently, any informal IRS advice-such as answers to taxpayers' telephone
inquiries-is completely nonbinding on the IRS. See, e.g., Pistillo v. Comm'r, 57 T.C.M.
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sumption, this presumption may be negated if the position contested on
audit has been blessed by an IRS representative before the return is filed.
Alternatively, such a position may receive a presumption of correctness.
To take another example, a gamer may decide that it is to his advantage
to elect CR, disclose one relatively strong but questionable position, but
keep the really aggressive parts of his return private. This way, the gamer
would insulate himself from high penalties in connection with a particu-
larly large transaction while taking a gamble on many smaller ones. One
way to deal with this situation (at least in part) would be to deny assur-
ances that come with receiving prefiling advice for a disclosed position if
an audit uncovers aggressive nondisclosed positions on the same return.
In sum, there are many potential separating mechanisms that create
value for non-gamers without benefiting gainers nearly as much. There
are also numerous separating features that impose costs on gamers with-
out significantly burdening non-ganers. In evaluating the merits of the
proposed dual enforcement regime, there is no reason to focus on any
particular one (including the pro-government presumption and binding
arbitration that may have anchored the reader's view by virtue of being
introduced early in the discussion). Rather, the variety of separating
mechanisms considered in this Part suggests that policymakers will have
many options if they embrace the conceptual approach suggested in this
Article.
F. Separation Versus Targeting
Having considered a number of separating features, this Part con-
cludes with a point of clarification: Separation is related to-but not co-
terminous with-targeting.
Separating features create incentives that compel gamers to choose
DR while inducing non-gamers to opt for CR. Targeting facilitates com-
pliance by each group of taxpayers. While there is no necessary connec-
tion between the policy instruments that accomplish each objective, there
is a substantial overlap between them. For instance, cooperative audits,
cost reimbursements to prevailing taxpayers, and measures aimed at de-
terring aggressive preparers not only enable separation, but also en-
courage (or facilitate, in the case of preparer-oriented measures) volun-
tary compliance.
Yet the overlap is not complete. Some separating features do noth-
ing to encourage cooperative taxpayers. Binding arbitration and a pro-
government presumption, to take two examples, do not strengthen a
sense of duty, trust in government, or feelings of reciprocity. These fea-
tures are unrelated to targeting. Likewise, targeting does not necessarily
facilitate separation. Appeals to taxpayer conscience, publicity about the
high level of overall CR compliance, and information about important
(CCH) 874, 881 (1989) ("[I]nformational assistance provided to a taxpayer by the [IRS] is
not binding on [it]."), rev'd on other grounds, 912 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1990).
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programs funded by tax dollars are examples of targeted cooperative en-
forcement strategies that have no separating effect. They do not impose
differential costs on-or provide differential benefits to-garners and
non-gamers, at least nothing nearly as substantial as those resulting from
the separating features discussed in this Part.
The point of fleshing out the relationship between separation and
targeting is analytical clarity. There is no reason to think that separating
features that also have a targeting effect are necessarily preferable to
those that do not.20 6 Rather, separating features should be evaluated
based on how effective and efficient they are in facilitating separation.
20 7
Once it is achieved, the government may experiment with many non-sep-
arating instruments to induce continuing compliance among non-
garners.
IV. PROS AND CONS OF THE DUAL ENFORCEMENT REGIME
In keeping with the spirit of the preceding discussion, the purpose of
this Part is not an exhaustive exploration of the pros and cons of each
possible feature of the dual enforcement regime. Rather, the goal is to
highlight some clear advantages of the proposal and to address some of
its shortcomings.
A. Advantages of the Dual Regime Framework
The main advantage of a dual enforcement structure-the separa-
tion of taxpayers by type that enables targeted tax enforcement-has al-
ready been discussed. Consideration of specific CR features reveals addi-
tional benefits.
1. Lower Social Cost of Tax Enforcement. - Many separating CR fea-
tures will dramatically reduce the social cost of tax enforcement. If tax
planning opportunities in CR are restricted while deterrence in DR is
strengthened, tax planning costs will decrease. Tax advisors will waste
less effort developing questionable schemes. Taxpayers will waste less
time searching for aggressive tax advisors. Contests involving the applica-
tion of the tax preparer privilege will disappear if the privilege does not
exist. If the only dispute resolution system available in CR is binding arbi-
tration, litigation costs will be eliminated. Because some of these costs
are externalized by the litigants and borne by the society as a whole, this
is a particularly attractive result.208 And, of course, risk-bearing losses in
CR will be small because nominal penalties will be low.
206. Of course, separating features that are detrimental to targeted enforcement
should be used with particular caution, as should targeting instruments that inhibit
separation.
207. At the same time, if two features are equally effective separators, but one also
encourages voluntary compliance while the other one does not, the first feature is more
attractive and may be adopted even if it is more costly than the second one.
208. See Shavell, Fundamental Divergence, supra note 191, at 577-78 ("[T]he legal
costs that an individual party bears generally are less than the full social legal costs, that is,
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Furthermore, the opportunity for gamers to elect CR will reduce the
per-taxpayer cost of higher DR fines. Among the many factors affecting
which garners will flee from large DR fines, one is risk aversion. 20 9 High
penalties are more costly for relatively more risk-averse garners, so they
are more likely to elect a low penalty regime. Those who remain will not
be as averse to uncertainty, and their risk-bearing losses will be smaller.
2. Benefits of Combining the Two Regimes. - Each of the two regimes
considered here has flaws. The shortcomings of each, however, are allevi-
ated by the existence of the other. The deficiencies of DR as the only
enforcement environment are clear. High nominal penalties applicable
to all taxpayers create large risk-bearing and other deadweight losses, pos-
sibly decrease compliance, and are unrealistic politically. The existence
of CR, offering much lower statutory fines, will go a long way toward elim-
inating all these limitations.
When considered in isolation, CR has many weaknesses as well. The
pro-IRS presumption and constraints on return preparers will make it dif-
ficult for taxpayers to challenge government's interpretations of the law.
They will also limit taxpayers' opportunities to test the line between per-
missible and illegal positions. Binding arbitration will undermine the de-
velopment of precedent, inhibit the public articulation of values, and
conceal overly aggressive enforcement from public scrutiny and judicial
review. 2 10 In a legal system that has some or all of these features, rules
remain imprecise and poorly targeted, standards fail to acquire content
through the development of precedent, lawmakers have no incentives to
produce high-quality legislation, public values remain obscure, and busi-
ness transactions are impeded by uncertainty and the threat of unchal-
lenged government power.
2 11
The existence of DR will alleviate most of these concerns. In that
regime, the IRS will have no advantage, taxpayers will be free to test the
boundaries of acceptable tax planning with the assistance of zealous advo-
cates, and courts will contribute to doctrinal development and act as a
check on unduly aggressive tax administrators. To ensure that decisions
made in CR do not introduce confusion and uncertainty into the tax law,
the costs borne by both litigants and by the state itself."). While litigation may produce
positive externalities as well, see id., many of these externalities (such as deterrence of
unwanted behavior) are absent when the other party to a suit is a federal agency.
209. Other factors include aggressiveness of tax positions, opportunities to conceal
tax avoidance or evasion (with better opportunities pointing toward choosing DR), and the
necessity of relying on a tax advisor or preparer (if the need exists, DR is more attractive).
210. For an example of a seminal tax case that simultaneously laid the foundation of
an important extrastatutory anti-abuse doctrine and announced a taxpayer's right to tax
planning, see Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935) (articulating the business
purpose doctrine while asserting that "[t]he legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the
amount of what otherwise would be his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means which
the law permits, cannot be doubted").
211. Many of these shortcomings have been emphasized by the opponents of
alternative dispute resolution. See, e.g., Sternlight, supra note 140, at 1661.
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they should have no precedential value. 212 Substantive tax law should be
the same for both regimes, and its content should be determined under
the familiar rules and protections of DR. Under these conditions, the
benefits of a fully adversarial system will remain largely intact, while its
costs will be substantially reduced.
Recognizing the importance of maintaining DR side by side with CR
underscores a key point that may be obscured by this Article's attention
to voluntary compliance: There is nothing wrong with being a gamer and
choosing DR! Gainers' preferences are as valid as those of reciprocators,
duty-bound taxpayers, and everyone else. Moreover, we need gamers to
make sure that DR will fulfill its crucial role in the dual enforcement
system.
3. Benefits of Choice Between the Two Regimes. - Some of the proposed
CR features will force taxpayers electing that regime to sacrifice impor-
tant rights. As the politics of plea bargaining, consensual police searches,
and the Supreme Court's Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Amendment juris-
prudence demonstrate, however, giving individuals an opportunity to re-
ject oppressive government treatment makes the treatment much more
acceptable. As long as a person consents, she may be searched without
reasonable cause, 213 interrogated without being represented by coun-
sel, 2 1 4 and convicted without exercising her constitutional right to
trial.2 1 5 Choice-even if illusory-changes the terms of legal discourse
and public debate.
Taxpayer choice, of course, is at the center of the dual regime. And
so it should be. It is clear that a substantial increase in statutory fines is
all but impossible if the fines are applied across the board.2 1 6 It is equally
unlikely that taxpayers will accept losing a right to defend their tax posi-
tions in a court of law in all circumstances. Yet it does not appear wholly
unrealistic that policymakers and taxpayers will agree to substantially
higher nominal DR fines and at least some of the suggested CR features if
these fines and features are optional.
212. If policymakers are particularly concerned with assuring this result, CR
arbitrators should produce no written decisions at all, and only announce their bottom
line conclusions. This rule may be disappointing, however, for the losing side. An
alternate solution would be to exempt decisions of CR arbitrators from the disclosure
requirements of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
213. See, e.g., Adrian J. Barrio, Note, Rethinking Schneckloth v. Bustamonte:
Incorporating Obedience Theory into the Supreme Court's Conception of Voluntary
Consent, 1997 U. Ill. L. Rev. 215, 219-22 (describing Supreme Court jurisprudence on
consensual searches).
214. See, e.g., WilliamJ. Stuntz, Waiving Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 Va. L. Rev.
761, 762-63 (1989) (noting that despite Sixth Amendment's facially robust protections,
waivers of right to counsel are common, and thus "uncounseled confessions in the police
station are commonplace").
215. See, e.g., Right to ajury Trial, 37 Geo. LJ. Ann. Rev. Crim. Proc. 519, 523-24
(2008).
216. See Graetz & Wilde, supra note 9, at 358.
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The inevitable argument that the dual regime is oppressive and de-
nies taxpayers important rights can be met with a convincing response. If
one is not interested in gaming the system, one can always choose CR and
enjoy prefiling advice and cooperative auditors who will correct one's
mistakes. And if the auditor turns out to be wrong, there will be resort to
an independent arbitrator and the possibility of a reimbursement of costs
combined with an apology. If, however, one likes to pay as little tax as
possible and is interested in pushing the limits of acceptable tax plan-
ning, there is a regime where one has every opportunity to pursue these
goals. But one is also required to bear the cost of being wrong, a cost that
today is indefensibly low for any well-informed, rational actor undertak-
ing the expected penalty analysis.
4. Dealing with Complex Motivations. - The schematic approach to
taxpayer motivations used to formulate and discuss the dual enforcement
framework-while surely richer than the standard deterrence story-is,
nonetheless, unrealistic. Some of us may be pure gainers or unwavering
reciprocators, but many are likely to act for multiple and varying reasons.
Thoughts about penalties may combine with feelings of shame and a
sense of duty to produce an ultimate decision about how much tax one
should pay.21 7 How will a dual regime accommodate this complexity?
In short, reasonably well. If people are driven by mixed motivations,
it is still possible to target enforcement by inducing taxpayers to choose a
predominant one. The dual enforcement regime will accomplish this by
requiring an affirmative choice between DR and CR. In making this
choice, taxpayers presumably will think about their relationship with tax
authorities and contemplate their income sources and tax planning op-
portunities. In the end, they will opt for the regime that is right for them,
essentially deciding which of their motivations predominates. In addition
to helping the IRS in its targeting efforts, this important process of self-
reflection will prompt taxpayers to (re)evaluate their view of the govern-
ment and, perhaps, (re)consider their attitudes toward taxes, spending,
and law enforcement. These are precisely the thoughts that will make
taxpayers better citizens regardless of which regime they end up
choosing.
Empirical evidence supporting the idea that people vary by type-
and do not merely act out of many conflicting motivations in an unpre-
dictable fashion-is limited. Yet it certainly exists. Psychologists have de-
veloped a self-categorization theory that provides for cognitive founda-
tions of social identity.21 8 Michael Wenzel has introduced a concept of
taxpayer identity and demonstrated that people with different identities
217. The idea that an individual is an aggregation of multiple selves is now dominant
in sociology and psychology. See Braithwaite, Dancing, supra note 2, at 14, 21 (raising
possibility that taxpayers may hold multiple motivational postures simultaneously).
218. See Michael Wenzel, The Multiplicity of Taxpayer Identities and Their
Implications for Tax Ethics, 29 Law & Pol'y 31, 34-35 (2007).
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have different views on the acceptability of tax evasion. 2 19 Other re-
searchers have found that participants' decisions in a multiparty social
dilemma game varied depending on whether their "decision frame" was
"Business" or "Ethical."220 In a different experiment, responses to the
threat of sanctions depended on whether subjects had high or low moral
reasoning, as determined by the Defining Issues Test.22 1 Choice of col-
lege major, it turns out, is a strong predictor of one's type. Compared to
psychology students, economics majors declared significantly less income
in a tax compliance game, were significantly less cooperative, and were
less concerned with the moral implications of tax evasion. 22 2 Surveys
show that taxpayer attitudes toward the tax collector fall into fairly de-
fined and internally consistent patterns that differ significantly from each
other. 22 3 In sum, when faced with cooperation/compliance dilemmas in
experiments and in real life, people do seem to exhibit different charac-
ter types and these types do appear to determine people's attitudes, in-
tentions, and behavior.
Granted, these arguments provide only a partial answer to the prob-
lem of motivational complexity. In deciding whether this answer is satis-
factory, one should keep in mind the existing enforcement regime. To-
day, virtually every taxpaying citizen is treated as a gamer.2 24 Taxpayers
have no opportunity to embrace and reveal a different predominant mo-
tivation. From this baseline, the proposed dual regime is a clear step
forward.
219. See id. at 43-44 (describing effects of three identities-exclusive individual
identity, inclusive national identity, and an intermediate subgroup or interest group
identity-on tax ethics).
220. See Tenbrunsel & Messick, supra note 71, at 694, 696. Frames were determined
based on respondents' answers to the question of whether they thought of their decision to
cooperate as a personal, business, ethical, environmental, or legal decision (the game
involved lobbying for new environmental legislation). While varying the sanction's
strength affected cooperative behavior of those adopting the business frame, it had no
effect on those who maintained the ethical one. Id. at 701.
221. Specifically, researchers found that only those with low moral reasoning altered
their tax evasion intentions in response to a threat of legal sanctions. See Steven E. Kaplan
et al., The Effect of Moral Reasoning and Educational Communications on Tax Evasion
Intentions, J. Am. Tax'n Ass'n, Fall 1997, at 38, 48. The Defining Issues Test "assess[es]
both . . .capacity for and usage of moral reasoning in decision making." Id. at 39. It "is a
psychometric instrument with high statistical reliability ...." Id. at 41. Contrary to the
authors' expectations, neither sanction threats nor moral appeals had a statistically
significant effect on intentions to evade of those with high moral reasoning. Id. at 48.
222. John Cullis et al., Tax Framing, Instrumentality and Individual Differences: Are
There Two Different Cultures?, 27J. Econ. Psychol. 304, 315 (2006). Because there were
many more females among psychology majors, it remains unclear whether gender
differences or some other factor(s) affecting the subjects' taxpaying decisions drove the
result. Id.
223. See Braithwaite, Dancing, supra note 2, at 15, 18 (listing five postures, including
"game playing").
224. Such measures as the Compliance Assurance Program, the Advanced Pricing
Agreement Program, the Private Letter Ruling Program, and the like affect only a tiny
fraction of all taxpayers. See supra note 54.
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Of course, an even more nuanced system would better reflect the
heterogeneous motivations of various taxpayers. If we could design prac-
tical and inexpensive ways to separate reciprocators from duty-bound tax-
payers from habitual compliers from rational non-garners, and if we knew
what policy instruments were particularly well-suited for taxpayers of each
type, we could improve our tax enforcement even further. Yet this
Article's effort to develop features that are likely to separate just two
broad taxpayer categories suggests that further fine tuning will be diffi-
cult. Furthermore, while scholars have an idea about enforcement mea-
sures that are likely to be effective for non-garners generally, 225 little is
known about which of these measures (or other instruments) will be ef-
fective with any given subcategory of non-garners. Thus, the limited pro-
posal advanced in this Article is a reasonable first step.
Another possibility for further fine tuning would involve varying en-
forcement based on easily identifiable characteristics of gainers and non-
gainers. For instance, it may be beneficial to have somewhat different
rules in DR, in CR, or in both regimes for businesses and individuals, for
large corporations and small proprietorships, for public and private com-
panies, and so on. However, it makes sense to examine such further dif-
ferentiation only after becoming convinced that the information-forcing
mechanisms discussed here can successfully produce the basic separation
of gainers and non-garners, and that this separation is likely to come at a
reasonable social cost-the topic considered next.
B. Weaknesses and Uncertainties of the Dual Regime Framework
1. Separating Equilibrium or No Separation? - It would be naive to as-
sume that all garners will choose DR and all non-gainers will elect CR. A
separating equilibrium-the one where each regime contains only tax-
payers of a single type-is implausible. The question, then, is what mix of
taxpayers is likely to exist in each regime.
Non-garners will have few reasons to prefer DR (with a caveat dis-
cussed in the next section). For garners, however, the choice will be
more difficult. Higher DR penalties will be unattractive, but many CR
features will be unappealing as well. At least for some garners, the cost of
facing DR fines will be higher than the cost of accepting CR conditions-
these taxpayers will opt for CR. DR will therefore be populated mostly by
garners, while CR will contain a mix of garners and non-garners. The re-
sult will be only a partial separation. Even this imperfect outcome, it is
worth emphasizing, is likely to be more efficient than no separation at all
because it will allow some targeting, albeit only to a limited extent.
The degree of separation will depend crucially on the relative costs
of the two regimes for garners. These costs, in turn, will be determined
by the difference between statutory DR and CR fines and by the CR sepa-
rating features. Comparing the effect of some of these features to that of
225. See supra note 85.
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larger DR fines will be easy. For instance, both nominal penalties and
probability of conviction are reflected in the expected payment
formula.2 26 Thus, CR measures aimed at increasing the latter can be di-
rectly compared to the effect of DR fines on the former. For other sepa-
rating features, however, a similar comparison is impossible. Steps re-
stricting opportunities to adopt aggressive positions, such as stronger
preparer sanctions (to take just one example), do not affect any of the
expected tax payment variables. Thus, no formula can determine what
combination of CR conditions will equal the overall deterrent effect of
any given increase in nominal DR penalties, let alone decide the optimal
relationship between those variables.
The uncertainty will be great, but perhaps not much greater than the
existing system's indeterminacy. Despite decades of tinkering with the
two basic variables (audit rates and nominal penalties), we know exceed-
ingly little about what levels of these variables are optimal or even appro-
priate. If the dual regime is adopted, policymakers will at least have one
clear indicator that the system does not work as designed: the number of
taxpayers in each regime. For instance, if very few taxpayers choose DR,
its nominal sanctions are too high. If all but a few choose DR, the oppo-
site is true. The alternative explanation that will have to be considered in
either case is that the CR separating features are ineffective and need to
be replaced with different ones. Overall, while a lot is unknown about
the proposed dual regime, additional uncertainty from switching to it
may not be particularly great.
2. The Price of Rights. - Most people value their rights. To some,
rights are important for instrumental reasons, as a means of securing or
protecting valuable entitlements. Others, however, approach rights in a
deontological sense-they value rights for rights' sake.
Many potential CR features deny, or at least impinge on, valuable
rights. Binding arbitration denies the right to trial. A pro-government
presumption denies the right to test the limits of the law. Absence of a
return preparer privilege denies the right to keep communications with
preparers confidential. These concessions will not be particularly costly
to non-gamers with an instrumentalist outlook because these taxpayers
will not expect to invoke the rights in question in the first place. 2 2 7 De-
ontological non-garners, however, present a problem. Even though they
have no rational reason to prefer DR, they will be compelled to choose it
because they will be unwilling to surrender their rights by accepting some
of the CR conditions.
226. See supra text accompanying note 120.
227. While an instrumentalist approach presumes rational thinking, it is possible that
an individual is only partially rational. For instance, one may think of a right to trial in
instrumentalist terms, yet be compelled to pay taxes by a sense of duty or desire to avoid
feelings of guilt or shame. Nonrationality, one should remember, does not mean random
or unpredictable behavior. See supra text accompanying note 26.
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It is difficult to address this problem other than by acknowledging it.
In contrast to the voluminous empirical data on contingent reciproca-
tors, little is known regarding the proportion of the population that cares
deeply about rights, the number of those who are deontologists, the aver-
age strength of their rights-regarding preferences, and the importance to
these individuals of specific rights affected by each of the suggested CR
features. In light of this pervasive uncertainty, I can only make a few
points suggesting that the problem is at least manageable.
People routinely surrender rights similar to those under considera-
tion here when they engage in private contracting. A binding arbitration
clause is a staple of credit card agreements, employment contracts, tax
preparation agreements, and other contracts entered into by tens of mil-
lions of taxpayers. 228 Even when consumers' health and lives-rather
than mere dollars-are at stake, they routinely agree to binding arbitra-
tion.229 Nor is the widespread surrender of valuable rights in exchange
for offsetting benefits limited to private law. The pervasiveness of plea
bargains provides clear evidence that citizens are willing to give up their
constitutional rights even when their freedom is at stake. 230 The adver-
sary in such cases is the government, not a credit card or insurance com-
pany. If the right to defend one's liberty in a court of law is routinely
sacrificed, it is difficult to see how the right to contest the determination
of a fixed monetary amount in court (as opposed to in front of a neutral
arbitrator) can be highly valued by most taxpayers.
To be sure, these arguments are imprecise. Yet precision will be im-
possible until substantial empirical evidence is assembled to address the
questions posited earlier in this section. For now, the analysis must be
limited to analogies and casual observations. Even so, it is reasonable to
assume that people have much stronger deontological views regarding
their right to freedom than concerning their right to a given sum of
money. Therefore, the reform discussed in this Article should be limited
to civil violations. Furthermore, not all CR features will affect rights
228. See Ronald J. Mann, "Contracting" for Credit, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 899, 919-20
(2006) (discussing impact of credit card arbitration clauses on utility of unconscionability
doctrine); Sternlight, supra note 140, at 1638 (noting proliferation of mandatory
arbitration across range of consumer contexts). As one court remarked, "[t]he reality [is]
that the average consumer frequently loses his/her constitutional rights and right of access
to the court when he/she buys a car, household appliance, insurance policy, receives
medical attention or gets a job." Knepp v. Credit Acceptance Corp., 229 BR. 821, 827
(Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1999).
229. Arbitration clauses appear with increasing frequency in hospital services
agreements, health maintenance organizations contracts, and nursing home contracts.
Sternlight, supra note 140, at 1639.
230. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101
Yale L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992) ("[Plea bargaining] is not some adjunct to the criminal justice
system; it is the criminal justice system."); Jennifer L. Mnookin, Uncertain Bargains: The
Rise of Plea Bargaining in America, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1721, 1722 (2005) (book review)
(stating that less than five percent of federal criminal defendants go to trial, and vast
majority of others participate in plea bargains).
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equally. Narrow measures such as agreements to disclose foreign bank
accounts and FIN 48 workpapers are not nearly as much of a sacrifice as
mandatory binding arbitration. Carrot-based approaches such as respect-
ful auditors, improved prefiling advice, and selective cost reimbursements
do not impinge on rights at all. If one is seriously concerned about deon-
tological rights-regarding non-gainers, one will prefer to rely on these ap-
proaches to separate gamers from the rest.
3. Dealing with Fraud. - Increasing the probability of conviction
through a pro-government presumption and binding arbitration makes
no difference if a taxpayer believes that this probability is already one
hundred percent. Constraining tax preparers has no effect on tax com-
pliance if a taxpayer lies to a preparer about her cash receipts. Nor does
it matter to this taxpayer whether her communications with the preparer
are privileged. For all these reasons, CR will do relatively little to impose
costs on tax evaders. Because higher DR fines will be costly for them,
evaders will have a strong incentive to choose CR. This is an undesirable
result.
Dealing with this problem is difficult, and no perfect solutions
emerge. But before we consider more general approaches, it is worth
pointing out three categories of evaders who will be unable to hide in CR.
First are those who fail to file their tax returns. 23 1 These taxpayers should
be automatically assigned to DR and face its higher penalties if they are
caught. The second category consists of those who fail to pay their as-
sessed tax liabilities. 23 2 These taxpayers are known to the IRS, and their
liabilities are not contested. The government will be equally free to pur-
sue them in both regimes. Finally, some evaders will be effectively de-
terred by narrow separating CR features. Few tax evaders with secret off-
shore bank accounts will elect CR if a blanket consent to disclosure of
banking information is one of its features. Evaders falling in these three
categories account for no less than $110 billion in uncollected taxes each
year-hardly an insubstantial amount.
2 33
Nonetheless, a significant portion of evaders do file returns and
could expect to remain undetected and unaffected by narrow separating
measures. What can the government do to prevent them from choosing
CR? First, taking an ex ante approach, the government may preclude
certain categories of taxpayers from electing CR in the first place. We
have a fairly good idea of which sectors of the economy exhibit the lowest
compliance rates. For instance, this rate for so-called "informal suppli-
231. Almost eight percent of the tax gap (or $27 billion) is attributable to failures to
file. See Toder, supra note 4, at 367-68.
232. Almost ten percent of the tax gap (or $33.3 billion) is attributable to failures to
pay. See id.
233. The $110 billion figure is a result of adding the estimated $50 billion number
reflecting offshore tax evasion, see supra note 157, to the $27 billion and the $33.3 billion
figures from the two preceding footnotes.
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ers" is a meager thirteen percent.23 4 Most likely, noncompliance here is
simply a failure to report cash receipts (evasion) by small street vendors,
domestic workers, and the like.2 35 It is highly unlikely that a large num-
ber of taxpayers in this category are duty-bound or driven by reciproc-
ity.2 3 6 Thus, relatively little will be lost if the government assumes that all
these taxpayers are gainers and places them in the appropriate (DR) re-
gime. The drawback, of course, is that some informal suppliers dutifully
pay their taxes. Forcing them into a high penalty environment may pro-
duce the detrimental effects discussed above.
Another solution is to make CR unavailable to fraudulent taxpayers
ex post. That is, even if a tax evader files a return and elects CR, her
election will be nullified if she is caught, the IRS alleges fraud, and it wins
in court (or in arbitration).237 The problem with this solution is its effect
on non-gamers. People make mistakes. While an elaborate, aggressive
tax scheme cannot be plausibly explained as an error, a failure to report
income may be, and the explanation may be truthful. If the draconian
measure just described can apply to mistaken taxpayers, many of the
problems associated with an across-the-board increase in nominal fines
will come back into the picture.
A reasonable middle-of-the-road solution is to combine ex post and
ex ante approaches. Taxpayers found guilty of tax evasion in CR should
be penalized (ex post) by losing the opportunity to elect that regime in
the future. 238 Granted, this penalty will fail to stop evaders from electing
CR, because they will prefer one "free ride" in that regime. Yet they will
have to choose when to "redeem" their free ticket by electing CR and
taking the risk of being caught and subsequently forbidden to make this
election in the future. In any case, this approach is a compromise that
has the substantial added benefit of gradually removing evaders from CR.
In sum, it will be difficult to keep some types of tax evaders in DR.
This does not mean, however, that an introduction of the dual regime
will benefit these gainers. If nominal sanctions and audit rates in CR are
the same as they are today, several of the proposed separating features
will make CR more costly for evaders than the existing regime. For in-
stance, if the binding arbitration feature is adopted, the probability of
fine in CR will be higher than it is now. The chance of future exclusion
from CR will add another cost. At the same time, several types of evaders
will be forced to accept DR and face stronger deterrence. Overall, there-
234. See Slemrod, Small Business, supra note 2, at 84-86.
235. See Slemrod, Cheating Ourselves, supra note 4, at 30 (referring to widespread
belief among tax professionals that while the wealthy tend to reduce their taxes through
avoidance, the poor mostly engage in outright evasion).
236. Observing widespread tax evasion by peers, a reciprocator would stop paying
taxes as well.
237. At that point, the taxpayer will also regain a right to trial, appeal, and all other
taxpayer-favorable DR features.




fore, the dual enforcement regime is likely to produce some increase in
compliance even among tax evaders.
4. Responding to Administrability Concerns. - While this Article's goal
is not to undertake a detailed analysis of a specific policy proposal, it is
worth making a few points about implementation issues. The specific
idea discussed here-and under any other information-forcing menu of
enforcement schedules-contemplates that taxpayers consider a choice
and make an affirmative election. Is it realistic to expect that much from
over 130 million taxpayers? To answer this question, we need to consider
three separate issues: whether most taxpayers can be made aware of this
choice; whether they are likely to actually make this choice; and whether
they can be expected to make the choice that is right for them.
Information dissemination is the least challenging of these tasks.
There are two main reasons for this guarded optimism: return preparers
and tax preparation software.2 39 In 2006, nearly 78 million individual
returns (61% of the total) were filed by preparers. 240 Surely tax profes-
sionals can be educated about the election and urged to stress its impor-
tance to their clients. To minimize the preparers' influence on their cli-
ents' choice of regime, preparers should be required to explain the
choice to their clients (perhaps even following a template approved by
the IRS) and face penalties for failing to do so. 241 Meanwhile, approxi-
mately 2.5 million corporate returns are filed each year.242 All, or almost
all, are prepared by lawyers and accountants. It is hard to imagine that
many corporations will fail to pay attention to the introduction of the
dual enforcement regime.
About 24 million individual returns filed without third-party assis-
tance in 2006 (19% of the total) were assembled using tax preparation
software. 24 3 Computer programs can be easily modified to open with a
screen announcing the substance of the CR/DR election and urging tax-
payers to take time and decide which regime they prefer. Four or five
bullet points describing the main DR and CR features (perhaps with a
239. Note that preparation software-rather than electronic filing-is the key. The
growing popularity of the latter, however, is likely to contribute to increased use of the
former.
240. See GAO Report, supra note 171, at 17.
241. Note that a potential problem of preparers steering taxpayers to a particular
regime will exist whether or not the special preparer-focused measures discussed in Part
III.D are adopted. For instance, audits are bound to be more contentious in DR because
taxpayers in that regime will dispute questionable positions (while taxpayers will have little
to gain from doing the same in CR). An unscrupulous preparer hoping to earn fees
during contentious audits will have an incentive to steer clients toward DR even if preparer
standards and penalties are the same in both regimes.
242. Slemrod, Small Business, supra note 2, at 92.
243. Of these, about 15 million were filed in paper form, and around 9 million were
e-filed. See GAO Report, supra note 171, at 14, 17. (These figures were calculated by the
author based on the GAO data.)
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link to another screen enumerating the rest) seem to be well within the
limited attention span of a typical taxpayer.
In addition, an educational campaign during the tax filing season
(TV, radio, and Internet ads, mass mailings, and so on) can help ensure
that even those who prepare their own returns using pencil and paper
(about 20% of the total, and declining) are aware of the new choice they
need to make. While the election requirement initially may catch some
taxpayers off guard, word of the dual regime will spread, and within a few
years most individuals will be fully aware of it.
The second concern-assuring that taxpayers actually choose one of
the regimes-is more serious. Granted, it should be possible to compel
the majority of taxpayers to make this choice. Return preparers can be
required to ensure that their clients choose one of the two regimes. Tax
preparation programs can do the same simply by disallowing users from
advancing to further screens without selecting DR or CR. IRS computer
systems can reject any electronically filed return that does not reflect an
affirmative choice of regime as well. But there is not much that can be
done to force taxpayers doing their taxes by hand and filing returns by
regular mail to choose between DR and CR. Thousands (and, perhaps,
millions) of these taxpayers may fail to make this choice in any given
year-they will simply fail to check either a "DR" or a "CR" box on their
returns. While it would be possible for the IRS to reject all such returns
as incomplete, an alternative solution would be to make one of the two
regimes a default.
Neither DR nor CR is an obvious candidate for the default regime
(with the exception of making DR a default for non-filers, as discussed
above24 4). The penalty default approach suggests that the default should
be countermajoritarian-the regime relatively few taxpayers would have
chosen upon careful deliberation. 24 5 Efficiency-based arguments focused
on transaction costs and insights from behavioral economics point in the
opposite direction. Choices are costly, and majoritarian defaults save
those costs. 24 6 Numerous studies have shown that defaults are sticky-
people often accept them out of inertia.24 7 If so, the default regime
should be the one most taxpayers would have preferred in any case.
Whichever consideration predominates in theory, the practical im-
plications are uncertain. It is unclear whether a substantial majority of
244. See supra text accompanying notes 231-233.
245. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 97, at 91 ("In contrast to the received wisdom,
penalty defaults are purposefully set at what the parties would not want-in order to
encourage the parties to reveal information to each other or to third parties . ).
246. See id. at 90 (describing dominant view at the time).
247. See, e.g., Brigitte C. Madrian & Dennis F. Shea, The Power of Suggestion:
Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior, 116 Q.J. Econ. 1149, 1150 (2001)
(finding that participation in pension plans is significantly higher when default choice is to
contribute to such plan). For a more wide-ranging elaboration on the theme of sticky
defaults, see Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About
Health, Wealth, and Happiness (2008).
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taxpayers would prefer DR or CR upon thoughtful deliberation once the
dual system is introduced. Without knowing the answer to this question,
the debate about whether a majoritarian or a countermajoritarian default
is more appropriate has little policy relevance.
Two other considerations do provide clear prescriptions, but unfor-
tunately they, too, point in opposite directions. On the one hand, the
choice between DR and CR is, at bottom, a rational choice. It requires
comparing the cost of higher expected sanctions in DR to the cost of CR
separating features. The burden of making a rational choice should be
placed on rational actors. This logic suggests that CR should be chosen
as the default regime, forcing gainers to make an affirmative DR election.
On the other hand, if CR contains one or more features abridging taxpay-
ers' rights, imposing this regime on careless taxpayers who fail to make an
election appears problematic. In the end, policymakers will need to de-
cide which of these considerations should determine the outcome.
The final question is whether most taxpayers will recognize which
regime is right for them. Assuming the government calibrates the rela-
tive expected costs correctly, gainers will have no trouble making the de-
cision. Because some non-gamers may be unsure how to choose between
unfamiliar options, the government should nudge them in the right di-
rection. 248 Framing is very important for nonrational individuals, so it is
not an accident that the proposed name of the new enforcement environ-
ment is the compliance regime. This name is meant to suggest to taxpay-
ers that if they think of themselves as complying with the tax law volunta-
rily, they should choose CR. Moreover, the educational campaign
launched by the IRS when the DR/CR choice is introduced should go
beyond simply informing taxpayers about the new dual enforcement re-
gime. Rather, it should emphasize which taxpayers would do better by
electing CR-those uninterested in minimizing their taxes by taking ag-
gressive positions.
C. Audit Rates and the Credibility of Government Commitments
The discussion thus far has assumed that audit rates in both regimes
are identical. That is, the government does not use the new information
about taxpayers (their choice of regime) to adjust its examination strat-
egy. If the IRS cannot credibly commit to maintaining the same audit
coverage in DR and CR, this assumption is decidedly unrealistic. Once
variable audit strategies are allowed, however, the analysis becomes signif-
icantly more complex. Tax compliance becomes a game rather than a
gamble. Both the government and taxpayers continuously adjust to each
other's actions. 249 Several attempts to model this interaction show that
248. See Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 247, at 1-8 (describing how changes in way
choices are presented can influence selection).
249. No doubt, taxpayers will respond to other CR separating features just like they
would have responded to varying audit rates. The difference between these features on the
one hand and audit coverage on the other is on the government's side. Once the
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the task is exceedingly complicated and removed from realities of day-to-
day tax administration.
250
If basing audit coverage on taxpayers' choices of regime will clearly
aid tax enforcement, a credible commitment to a uniform audit strategy
will be impossible. If, however, it is uncertain which regime should fea-
ture more frequent audits, maintaining identical audit rates may be the
government's best option, making its decision to do so credible. A num-
ber of competing considerations suggest that this is precisely the situation
the government will face.
On the one hand, a familiar analysis suggests that audit rates should
be higher in DR. Audits are the best deterrent. Because most taxpayers
in DR will be gamers who respond to deterrence, they should be audited
more heavily. Audits are also costly, and these costs are largely wasted if
auditors find no noncompliance. Taxpayers are likely to be more compli-
ant in CR. Hence, a lower audit rate is appropriate there. In addition,
there is some evidence that intrusive control by authorities crowds out
voluntary compliance. 25 I This is yet another reason to have relatively low
audit rates in CR.
On the other hand, audits may be used to approach a separating
equilibrium-a critical consideration in the proposed dual regime.
Gamers will compose the majority of taxpayers in DR. CR, however, will
contain both non-gainers and gamers (some evaders and the most aggres-
sive avoiders). By increasing CR audit coverage, the government will en-
hance its capacity to identify gamers who elect CR and deny them a
chance to do so again. In addition, more frequent CR audits will deter
evaders from electing CR in the first place. Both considerations suggest
that audit rates should be higher in CR to facilitate separation.
In sum, the conventional deterrence analysis suggests that audits
should be more frequent in DR while the goal of reaching a separating
equilibrium points strongly toward the opposite conclusion. It is unclear
which of these competing considerations should prevail. But the mere
presence of strongly competing considerations makes the government's
precommitment not to vary audit rates between the two regimes credible.
One type of audit selection technique, however, is not subject to this
logic. Some taxpayers will choose DR in one year and CR during the
next. If this happens once or twice, there may be an innocuous explana-
government creates the dual regime and announces CR features such as binding
arbitration or high preparer penalties, it will be fairly difficult to keep changing these
features without compromising the entire tax enforcement mechanism. Furthermore, any
such subsequent changes will be highly public. Neither constraint applies to the
government's adjustment of audit rates, which can be done continuously and
surreptitiously, forcing taxpayers to anticipate the government's response to taxpayers'
initial adjustments and leading to the complexities mentioned in the text.
250. For an example of one such model, see Graetz et al., Tax Compliance Game,
supra note 18, at 5-9. For a discussion of the numerous limitations of game-theoretic
models, see Raskolnikov, Self-Adjusting Penalty, supra note 6, at 629.
251. See supra notes 64, 71 and accompanying text.
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tion. For instance, a taxpayer may initially elect DR by mistake. Once the
mistake is realized, the taxpayer will change her election in future years.
If, however, a taxpayer repeatedly jumps from one regime to another, he
reveals himself as a gamer. Auditing this taxpayer in CR is likely to detect
aggressive tax planning and enable the IRS to prevent this taxpayer from
hiding in CR in the future.
CONCLUSION
The one-size-fits-all approach to tax enforcement has reached its lim-
its. This Article explores how information-forcing mechanisms such as
the penalty default and menu selection may be used to improve tax ad-
ministration. The specific reform considered in detail is the most basic
application of these mechanisms-a dual enforcement regime designed
to force many taxpayers to reveal their motivations for paying taxes to the
IRS. Armed with this information, the government will be able to target
enforcement, improving tax compliance while reducing its social cost.
The merits of the proposed reform turn on the resolution of two key
questions. First, is it fruitful to separate taxpayers based on whether or
not they are gainers? Second, is it possible? The Article answers both
questions in the affirmative-the first one decisively, the second one
more tentatively. Gainers are unique because their behavior is well de-
scribed by a thoroughly developed economic model. We know how to
deter garners. We also have an idea about strategies that are likely to
influence all others, and it is clear that the two sets of approaches are very
different. Thus, the gamer/non-gamer division is a productive one.
It is also achievable-certainly for avoiders, and to a limited extent
for evaders. Whatever one thinks of the specific compliance regime fea-
tures discussed in this Article, it is clear from their sheer number and
variety that policy instruments that impose different costs or bestow dif-
ferent benefits on garners and non-garners do exist. These instruments
may be deployed to accomplish the desired separation, even if imper-
fectly. Considering how to improve this separation-and how to move
beyond the basic dual regime structure examined in this Article-is a
promising avenue for future research that should be pursued in addition
to (if not in lieu of) the ongoing discussion of audits, fines, and
deterrence.
[Vol. 109:689
